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Abstract 
Ramsey’s Universals has not been served well by its critics and, as a result, the real 
and important contentions of Ramsey’s essay are often obscured in discussion of his 
work. This thesis is intended to form the beginning of an attempt to rectify this by 
offering an exposition and critique of Ramsey’s essay that is particularly sensitive to 
the background context and purpose of the essay as a whole and to the subtle 
structure of the argumentation within it. 
     The construction of the arguments in Universals is so intricate that to assess any of 
its arguments without placing them in the context of the overall strategy of 
Ramsey’s essay is to grossly underestimate them. For this reason, most of the labour 
in this thesis will be directed towards articulating Ramsey’s concerns in his essay 
and the way in which Ramsey’s arguments are supposed to supplement each other 
in order to establish his main contentions. These tasks take up the first two 
chapters. Only then will the third chapter consider one particular argument- the 
incomprehensible trinity argument- and assess whether it is successful by first 
identifying the role that the argument is intended to play in the overall structure of 
Ramsey’s argument and then asking whether or not the argument can be said to 
fulfil such a role.  
     This final chapter is a mere beginning towards a proper critique of Ramsey’s 
difficult and subtle argumentation in Universals. Nonetheless it serves as an example 
of how offering a critique of Ramsey which places his arguments within the context 
3 
 
and concerns of the essay as a whole, while it does not immediately vindicate them 
of all criticism, shows them to be far more subtle and robust than they have been 
estimated to be.  
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Introduction 
 
Ramsey’s article Universals is about as well-known as it is undervalued. Though it 
has been influential and is considered by most to be somehow important, the 
majority of what has been quoted or criticised about the paper has focused on one 
or other of its arguments in isolation. This includes Dummett (1981), Geach (1975) 
Anscombe (1959), Armstrong (1978), Oliver (1992), and Moore (1962), to name 
but a few. A focused exegesis or critique of a single aspect of a paper is a common 
and useful practise but Ramsey’s article has been not been served well by this 
approach. The nature and subtlety of the view that Ramey intends to challenge 
causes him to adopt a non-standard methodology in his paper which employs a 
careful balance between argumentation and diagnostic and produces arguments that 
are interdependent and work as a whole to support Ramsey’s overall conclusion. 
For this reason, ignoring the context and wider concerns of Universals has meant that 
Ramsey’s arguments have been either undervalued or misrepresented. Furthermore 
Ramsey’s real concerns have not been carried along with attention to the arguments 
in the essay and as such they have failed to be assimilated into contemporary debate. 
     This thesis will aim to provide two things. In the first two chapters, it will begin 
the work of providing an accurate and helpful overview of Ramsey’s article of the 
kind that is lacking in the secondary literature. It will do so by focusing the exegesis 
in such a way that is sensitive to the unique structure of Ramsey’s paper. The third 
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and final chapter will be an exercise in a more suitable kind of evaluation of one of 
Ramsey’s most famous arguments: one that gives central place to the context of the 
argument and of its relation to the overall argument of Universals. For this reason 
the approach of the thesis will be primarily to engage first hand with Ramsey’s text 
in order to lay out its structure and concerns, rather than responding to an existing 
secondary literature. Having said this it will be necessary to provide a detailed 
exposition of one particular secondary source; Bertrand Russell. Ramsey’s 
contentions simply cannot be understood without some attention to Russell who is 
the cause of Ramsey’s investigation, the source of his background metaphysical 
framework, and the individual to whom the article is explicitly addressed. 
     It is important to try and establish the real contentions of Universals given the 
fame and influence of the essay. Though this is a worthy task in its own right it also 
serves as a general lesson in rediscovering theoretical perspectives that have been 
dismissed or underestimated because they have been unfavourably and damagingly 
cut off from their intended context. Criticism of such arguments is taken to be 
decisive when it merely refutes a specimen half made of straw and this deprives the 
contemporary arena of the real and more substantial concerns that the arguments 
are directed towards. This is not to imply that drawing out a particular aspect of 
some theory or focusing on some argument in isolation is not, most often, an 
extremely fruitful philosophical method. Instead it is merely to recommend 
exercising some care in how we extract an argument for examination and critique, 
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ensuring that it is not too radically divorced from the context in which it was 
intended to function in a way that would substantially weaken its force since such an 
error could lead to the important philosophical concerns of the argument and its 
context to be lost or ignored. 
     The thesis will take the following course. The first chapter will elucidate 
Ramsey’s main concerns in the article by attempting to characterise the precise 
contention that he seeks to reject. The struggle to pull out Ramsey’s target and to 
accurately identify the subtlety of the way in which he opposes these ideas will lead 
us to a discussion of the different kinds of incompleteness that are in play, as well as 
a thorough exposition of Russell and his theory of universals spanning across 1911 
to 1918. The second chapter will engage more directly with Ramsey’s article 
expounding the overall strategy of the essay towards engaging with Ramsey’s 
opponent. It will then present the detail of the arguments that Ramsey employs 
within the context of the article’s wider structure. It will be concerned to focus on 
representing the intricately interrelated nature of the arguments as well as the role 
that the arguments play towards the overall conclusion of Ramsey’s essay rather 
than independently assessing the success of each argument. The third chapter will 
then critique perhaps the most infamous of Ramsey’s arguments, the 
incomprehensible trinity argument. It will explore the mechanisms of the argument 
by using Dummett’s distinction between analysis and decomposition and expose the 
erroneous assumption that the argument relies on. The second half of the chapter 
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will consider where this mistaken assumption comes from and, in particular, 
whether or not Ramsey is guilty of making it. To do so it will bring in the wider 
context of Universals and Ramsey’s aims in the paper in order to suggest that the 
situation is not as simple as one in which Ramsey’s incomprehensible trinity 
argument is straightforwardly based on a fundamental confusion. 
     It will conclude that the although Ramsey’s incomprehensible trinity argument 
can be identified as relying on certain assumptions, once we take into account the 
wider view of Universals, we can understand why Ramsey leaves them implicit as he 
does. Furthermore, while the assumptions that the argument makes may be 
undefended they are, at least, plausible positions. In this way they differ from the 
confused assumptions that Ramsey is usually attributed with by most assessors of the 
incomprehensible trinity argument and in particular Dummett (1981). 
     In the most succinct of summaries: the first chapter will characterise what 
Ramsey aims to reject; the second will expound how Ramsey’s article is constructed 
so as to reject these ideas; and the third chapter will explore whether Ramsey is 
successful in employing one of his arguments towards this end. 
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Chapter one 
 
After a brief introduction to Ramsey’s article this chapter will consider Ramsey’s 
conclusions in Universals. It will resolve an apparent tension in his conclusion by 
examining Russell’s theory of universals and demonstrating that the two aspects in 
Ramsey’s conclusion respond to different aspects in Russell’s early and later 
thought. It will then more precisely characterise the nature of Ramsey’s contention 
in the essay by distinguishing three different types of incompleteness and clarifying 
Ramsey’s position regarding each of them. 
 
1.1 Ramsey’s article and its conclusion 
This section will give a short introduction to Ramsey’s article; sketching out its aims 
and the conclusion that it reaches. It will then draw out two different strands in 
Ramsey’s conclusion which appear to be in tension with each other. The search for 
a resolution to this tension will lead us to an exposition of Russell. 
 
1.1.1 A brief overview of the article 
The title and topic of Ramsey’s essay is ‘Universals’. He begins his article by 
formulating what it is that he intends to call into question: 
 
The purpose of this paper is to consider whether there is a fundamental division of objects 
into two classes, particulars and universals (Ramsey, 1931:112). 
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His approach towards answering this question however is unlike contemporary 
contributions to the universals debate. Ramsey has a very particular target in sight: 
Russell’s theory of universals. As such Ramsey’s essay does not investigate the 
multifarious incarnations of such an ontological posit, and barely acknowledges 
arguments traditionally advanced in favour of, and in opposition to, universals.  
     It is how and what Ramsey takes issue with regarding Russell’s particular 
conception of universals, however, that gives the essay its untypical direction of 
argumentation. From the outset Ramsey reorients his investigation away from 
straightforwardly assessing the failings and merits of Russell’s theory. Instead his 
essay is concerned with the failings and merits of the reasons that have led 
philosophers, and in particular Russell, to hold that there must be universals and to 
separate off legitimate concerns regarding this ontological claim from certain 
assumptions and considerations that have been wrongly assimilated into the debate. 
 
1.1.2 Ramsey’s conclusion 
Ramsey’s conclusion in the essay brings into focus exactly what he is concerned 
with isolating and rejecting as the illegitimate considerations that have led to the 
theory of universals. In the penultimate line of the essay he declares the theory of 
universals to be a ‘great muddle’ (1931:134). To the question of whether there is a 
fundamental division between objects into particulars and universals he concludes 
that we do not and cannot know (1931:133).  
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The muddle 
The muddle Ramsey takes to be a muddle between names and incomplete symbols. 
To explain this roughly: by ‘name’ Ramsey means a simple name of a simple object. 
He borrows the term ‘incomplete symbol’ primarily from Russell who holds that a 
symbol that is incomplete can only be defined in connection with other symbols and 
so does not mean or stand for anything in the world. Any misleading syntactic 
appearance the symbols have to the contrary will disappear upon analysis (Russell, 
1918:253; Ramsey, 1931:130)1. 
     For Ramsey, incomplete symbols and names are two very different kinds of 
symbol which derive from very different directions of enquiry and as such must be 
recognised as two philosophically distinct categories. The illegitimate assimilation of 
the properties of namehood and incompleteness has led to the idea that there are 
incomplete symbols which are also names, so that some incomplete symbols do 
stand for things in the world. Furthermore, what these symbols stand for must be 
incomplete in some way corresponding to that which designates them (Ramsey, 
1931:134). The muddled notion that there must be things in the world which are 
incomplete has given rise to the notion that there are universals. It has led Russell to 
say that universals depend on the form of the proposition in a way that particulars 
do not, in this way accounting for their incompleteness (Russell, 1918:205). The 
theory of universals, therefore, has come about due to this conflation of two 
                                                          
1
 As will become clear, however, Ramsey’s usage of the term incomplete symbol is wider than Russells. 
16 
 
philosophically very different kinds of thing; incomplete symbols and names. This, 
at any rate, is Ramsey’s view of the terrain.  
 
The agnostic 
Ramsey remains explicitly agnostic about whether there is a fundamental division 
between objects into particulars and universals (1931:134-135). He takes it that we 
could only conclude that such a fundamental division held between objects if we had 
knowledge of the forms of atomic propositions. Atomic propositions would have to 
reflect this deep distinction in reality in order to represent it; therefore, if such a 
division was to be found in atomic propositions, we could infer that it must obtain 
between objects in reality (1931:135). Since Ramsey agrees with Wittgenstein that 
we are not acquainted with atomic propositions, however, it follows that we cannot 
know if such a distinction obtains between objects or not (Ramsey, 1931:123).  
     In his post-script Ramsey revises, to some extent, his view regarding our access 
to atomic propositions. He states that he has come to believe that the forms of 
atomic propositions may be discoverable by ‘actual analysis’ (1931:135). It is not 
easy to say how far exactly this retracts upon his previous view but Ramsey’s 
position regarding whether there are universals can still be characterised as an 
agnostic one. This is because on the one hand he explicitly accepts that there is no 
impossibility that the forms of atomic propositions would be such that they would 
support a theory of universals (ibid), though this is no deviation from his previous 
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view (1931:133). On the other hand he stresses that there is ‘no strong 
presumption’ that the analysis would give this result (1931:135). This is because he 
maintains that the work done in his article shows that the forms of atomic 
propositions - and thus whether there are universals - cannot be known a priori, i.e. 
in advance of actual analysis. For this reason Ramsey may be said to advocate 
agnosticism pending analysis regarding such a question; maintaining that we cannot 
know a priori whether the forms of atomic propositions support a fundamental 
division of objects into particular and universal. 
 
The agnostic and the muddle 
We can summarise Ramsey’s conclusion to be that the theory of universals is a 
muddle, a conflation of two philosophically disparate ideas and that we cannot 
know, a priori at least, whether or not universals exist. Ramsey’s conclusion, then, 
contains two separable strands; the first that the theory of universals is a muddle and 
the second that we cannot know a priori whether they exist. No sooner are these 
strands identified, however, than the worry arises that they are in tension with each 
other. 
     As we saw, Ramsey begins his paper with the question of whether there is a 
fundamental division between objects into particulars and universals. Though the 
first strand of his conclusion does not address this question directly, it still provides 
an answer to it. In particular, given that the first strand holds that a conflation of 
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different features of different symbols has led to the muddled notion of a universal, 
it follows that there can be no such thing as a universal. Whatever entity is 
purported to exist because of a confusion will of course disappear along with the 
untangling of the ideas that were illegitimately assimilated together in the first 
place. Plainly, if something is a muddle, it can’t be right. To declare something as 
muddled, therefore, is enough to reject it. Ramey’s denouncement of universals 
thus makes the investigation into whether they exist redundant. Yet in the second 
strand of his conclusion where Ramsey explicitly addresses the question that guides 
his investigation, he remains agnostic about whether there are universals. 
Furthermore he goes onto concede in his post-script that ‘actual analysis’ could 
discover there to be universals as Russell had envisaged (1931:135). The results of 
legitimate analysis, however, could never establish something that was a muddle. It 
would be like discovering a round square. It would not be a discovery, but a 
mistake. 
     Therefore, it seems that in order to remain an agnostic Ramsey must drop the 
claim that the theory of universals is a muddle. That there is an illegitimate 
conflation between namehood and incompleteness, however, forms the central 
argument and purpose of Ramsey’s paper. It’s clear that this strand of his conclusion 
cannot be dropped. In order to consistently argue that there is such a muddle, on 
the other hand, Ramsey must strengthen his agnosticism to full blown scepticism 
regarding the existence of universals. However, as we shall see, this is a much 
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stronger claim than is supported by the arguments in Ramsey’s paper and 
furthermore is not the kind of view that Ramsey wants to advocate. It is clear, then 
then that the two strands of Ramsey’s conclusion seem to be in conflict with each 
other.  
     It is not obvious how to approach this conflict and separate out the ideas that 
Ramsey is looking to reject from those that he leaves open as potentially legitimate 
considerations. I suggest that we should begin where Ramsey himself began, that is 
to say, with Russell. Ramsey’s essay after all is a specialised and directed attack on 
certain ideas in Russell’s philosophy regarding universals. To understand the 
different strands of Ramsey’s response to Russell therefore we must begin at the 
source of Russell’s theorising about universals, the different considerations he 
brings into play and the wider philosophical picture into which they are placed. It is 
only within this context that we can attempt to makes sense of the conflict in 
Ramsey’s conclusion and to expound the details of Ramsey’s arguments. For this 
reason the following section will provide a substantial exposition of Russell’s views 
regarding universals spanning from 1912 to 1918 which will be drawn upon 
throughout the thesis as the starting point of Ramsey’s critique.  
 
1.2 Russell’s theory of universals 
Ramsey attributes the formulation of the question that opens his essay (whether 
objects divide into particulars and universals) to Russell’s essay; The Relation of 
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Universals and Particulars (1912). Concurrently with this article Russell forwards a 
view of universals in The Problems of Philosophy (1912). Though Ramsey does not 
explicitly mention The Problems of Philosophy in his essay a comparison of these two 
parallel writings will be fruitful in expounding the more general view that Ramsey 
encounters in Russell. As Ramsey’s paper develops, however, it becomes clear that 
he is attributing to Russell the position that Russell adopts around 1918, articulated 
most clearly in The Philosophy of Logical Atomism (1918). Therefore in order to 
expound the relevant view that Ramsey is counteracting this section will track 
Russell’s theory of universals spanning these three works hereafter referred to as 
RPU, PP and PLA respectively. 
 
1.2.1 Universals in The Problems of Philosophy 
In The Problems of Philosophy (1912) Russell devotes two chapters to presenting his 
idea of a universal in an intuitive and accessible way. He then proceeds to discuss 
the kinds of considerations that he takes to be relevant to the debate in varying 
levels of detail. Significantly, nowhere in the article does he directly argue for the 
claim that there are universals. Instead he is focused on clarifying various features of 
universals and how they contrast with particulars. As a result, the two chapters on 
the topic provide a picture of Russell’s conception of universals around this time 
rather than a defence of the existence of universals.  
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Universals in language  
In his chapter ‘The World of Universals’ Russell notes that, in general, particulars 
are denoted by proper names and universals by ‘other substantives, adjectives, 
prepositions and verbs’ (1912:48). He is fervent in emphasising that universals 
include not only qualities (denoted by predicates) but also relations (ibid). He 
makes this clear from the plethora of examples of universals he gives: those typified 
in sense-data such as ‘white…sweet…loud, hard’ but also ‘time-relations’ and 
‘space-relations’ such as ‘being to the left of’, ‘before’, ‘after’, ‘resemblance’ or 
‘similarity’ relations between sense-data, etc. (1912:47-53). Indeed, Russell 
regards the failure to recognise the separate existence of relations as responsible for 
much metaphysical error and confusion (1912:48-50). It is for this reason that 
Ramsey surmises Russell’s view to be that universals are given by the class of 
predicates and the class of relations (1912:113). 
 
Russell’s Platonic realism 
At the beginning of the same chapter Russell modifies Plato’s ‘theory of ideas’ in 
order to present his conception of a universal. He observes with Plato that in order 
to investigate a notion such as ‘justice’ we will consider the different acts that are 
just. That is to say, we will consider what it is that is preserved across the variety of 
these acts. Russell then identifies the intuition that ‘justice’ is constituted by what 
just acts have in common with each other. This is not to say, as he stresses, that 
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justice is to be identified with its particular instances but rather that it is something 
over and above them of which its particular instances partake (1912:47). The same 
is true of notions such as tall, hot, shy, breakable and those that ‘will be applicable 
to a number of particular things, because they all participate in a common nature or 
essence’ (ibid). Russell calls such entities ‘universals’, avoiding the platonic 
terminology of ‘ideas’ (ibid).  
     On Plato and Russell’s account, universals do not exist in the ‘world of sense’ 
(ibid). According to Russell our most direct interaction with the world is in the 
ever-fluctuating impressions and experiences that constitute our sense-data 
(1912:8). It is an intrinsic feature of such sense-data that it is particular. Thus 
Russell’s summary: 
 
We speak of whatever is given in sensation, or is of the same nature as things given in 
sensation, as a particular, in opposition to this, a universal will be anything which may be 
shared by many particulars, and has those characteristics which, as we saw, distinguish 
justice and whiteness from just acts and white things (Russell, 1912:48). 
 
Russell expands on this idea in the following chapter where he discusses our 
knowledge of universals. He holds that there are some universals we are acquainted 
with such as ‘white’ and some we know through description such as ‘greater than’. 
In the case of knowledge by acquaintance:  
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…when we see a white patch, we are acquainted, in the first instance, with the particular 
patch; but by seeing many white patches, we easily learn to abstract the whiteness which 
they all have in common. (Russell, 1912:52, emphasis added) 
 
The idea is that those universals which can be known by acquaintance are those 
which are abstracted more immediately from the particular cases while universals 
that are known by description require a greater degree of abstraction (1912:53). 
The universal ‘similarity’, for example, can be abstracted from two experiences of 
white but we must subsequently deduce from two relations of similarity the 
universal ‘more similar than’ or ‘greater than’ (1912:52). In both cases though, it is 
still the case that universals are ‘abstracted’ from particulars. Therefore while 
particulars are immediate to us in our sense-data, universals always require a 
process of abstraction (to some greater or lesser degree) from our particular 
experiences in order for us to be acquainted with them. This is what Russell means 
by saying that only particulars exist in the ‘world of sense’ (1912:47). 
     A related feature of universals according to Plato and Russell is that, not being in 
the world of sense, they lack the characteristic of being in a perpetual state of 
change. By contrast to those momentary things given in sensation, universals are 
eternal and unchanging (1912:47). Russell claims that it is this quality of universals 
that led Plato to posit the ‘world of ideas’ of which the reality we experience is only 
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a pale reflection (ibid). For Plato the impermanence of the ever-altering particulars 
given in sensation makes them ‘less real’ than the immutable universals of which 
they are instances. Though Russell largely adopts Plato’s position he does not afford 
the ‘supra-sensible world’ with the same metaphysical priority that Plato does 
(ibid). 
  
The existence of universals 
For Russell, rather than an obscure philosophical posit, universals are centrally 
significant to many areas of philosophy and to our knowledge of truth. It’s clear that 
in The Problems of Philosophy Russell conceives of universals to be such that they are 
already deeply familiar to us and that their existence is not especially contestable. 
This is clear, for instance, when he remarks: 
 
Seeing that nearly all the words to be found in the dictionary stand for universals, it is 
strange that hardly anyone except students of philosophy ever realises that there are such 
entities as universals (Russell, 1912:48). 
 
That the existence of universals is not more widely acknowledged Russell attributes 
to our affinity with particulars so that we contemplate the instances of a universal 
and not the universal itself. We do not draw the same ontological commitments 
from terms for universals as we do from names for particulars because: 
 
25 
 
We feel such words to be incomplete and insubstantial; they seem to demand a context 
before anything can be done with them (Russell, 1912:48). 
 
This idea sows the seed for a thought that, as we shall see, is developed by Russell in 
Philosophy of Logical Atomism and is articulated by Ramsey as a central motivation 
behind Russell’s theory of universals. 
     On the face of it Russell is more concerned in the book to explain and expound 
his theory of universals while the question of whether or not there are universals is 
never addressed directly. It is addressed indirectly however, when Russell denies 
the reducibility of universals to particulars, and it’s also clear that Russell considers 
this sufficient to satisfy the question of their existence (1912:49). Indeed, he 
introduces the discussion following the irreducibility of universals thus: ‘Having 
now seen that there must be such entities as universals…’ (Russell, 1912:50). 
     Russell’s discussion of the irreducibility of universals takes the form of a rebuttal 
of Berkeley and Hume’s idea that when we conceive of something like 
‘triangularity’ we do so by conceiving of a particular triangle, and reasoning about it 
in such a way that we exploit only those features it shares with other particular 
triangles (1912:49). Thus we are not required to posit universals; they are 
accounted for by the particulars which Russell takes to be their instances. Russell 
argues against this view by pointing out that in order to exploit only those features 
that triangles have in common one has to rely on a notion of what their common 
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features are. In other words, we cannot recognise that certain diverse particulars 
are all triangles unless we already have in play some way of identifying them as a 
class. According to Russell, whatever Berkeley and Hume employ to account for 
this problem cannot be particular. Whether they admit there to be triangularity 
which the triangles partake in, or a relation of resemblance between the shapes that 
enables us to group them as a class, or even a second-order resemblance between 
the resemblance relations that hold between the triangles, they will be forced to 
admit some kind of universal. He then concludes that: 
 
…having been forced to admit this universal, we find that it is no longer worthwhile to 
invent difficult and implausible theories to avoid the admission of such universals as 
whiteness and triangularity (Russell, 1912:49). 
 
     Leaving aside the adequacy of Russell’s representation of Berkeley and Hume 
and granting Russell the claim that to admit a universal such as resemblance is to 
open the flood gates to admitting the plethora of universals he envisages, there is 
still an assumption in Russell’s argument that seems strangely undefended. It is that 
if we accept the truth of the proposition ‘triangle A resembles triangle B’, for 
example, then we accept that the resemblance relation in the proposition denotes 
the existence of a universal. This point is made by Bostock: 
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Russell’s assumption seems to be that if you accept the truth of any such [simple sentence 
containing a predicate] then you thereby accept the existence of an entity that is named by 
nominalising its predicate. That entity will be a universal. No wonder Russell writes as if 
the existence of universals is not - or should not be - a matter of controversy (Bostock, 
2012:243). 
 
    In fact Russell makes the stronger claim that every sentence contains a word that 
denotes a universal (whether or not its grammatical form makes this obvious). From 
this he concludes that all truths must involve universals (1912:48). Here again we 
see that Russell adopts a position of Platonic realism regarding universals. 
Articulating this assumption therefore explains the attitude Russell adopts towards 
defending universals and why he takes the existence of universals so much for 
granted, as Bostock points out. However, it also helps to explain why Russell does 
not even articulate any of the competing positions that stand opposed to his Platonic 
realism and thus does not adequately defend the assumption on which so much 
seems to rest regarding his approach to and conception of universals.  
 
Mind-independence  
Legitimately or not, Russell takes his demonstration of the irreducibility of 
universals to afford them some kind of existence and his next move is to argue that 
this existence is mind-independent.  
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He first observes that certain facts involving universals such as ‘Edinburgh is north 
of London’ will be true whether or not there are minds (1912:50). In other words, 
I do not make such a proposition true by knowing it; I discover that it is true. If the 
proposition is mind-independent, Russell continues, it must be the case that its 
constituents are also mind-independent. For if they were not then the proposition 
would be dependent on the mind after all, since it depends for its truth on its parts. 
Since propositions involving universals are mind-independent and since they have 
universals as their constituents it follows that universals must be mind-independent 
(1912:50). 
     If we concede to Russell that propositions are mind-independent, this argument 
still requires the same assumption of Russell’s Platonic realism that substantiates his 
argument for the existence of universals. Otherwise Russell cannot assume that 
when we speak of the propositions that ‘involve’ universals what we mean is that 
the propositions have universals as their constituents. For, it is the premise that 
universals are parts of proposition’s that enables Russell to conclude that they too 
must be mind-independent.  
     Another argument Russell puts forward to this effect is that if universals were 
dependant on the mental then they would be robbed of perhaps their most essential 
feature, that of their universality (1912:51). In order to say that two people can 
apprehend the same universal it must be that the universal has some kind of 
objectivity akin to the objectivity of particulars. Universals are denied this 
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important feature, however, if they are conceived of as private mental objects 
(ibid). 
 
Subsistence 
Russell diagnoses that people have mistakenly thought of universals as mental 
entities because of the ‘very peculiar kind of being that belongs to universals’ 
(1912:50). This brings to the fore a question that has so far remained in the 
background of Russell’s account, namely, what Russell means when he claims that 
universals exist. We have seen that universals are not mental and yet neither are 
they physical: they do not exist in the world of sense and they do not exist in time, 
yet they have some kind of being which Russell takes to be demonstrated by their 
irreducibility. We may legitimately wonder what it means to say that something 
exists although it is not in the world of sense and it is independent of time; such 
characteristics being at least typical of existing things. Whatever this ‘peculiar’ kind 
of existence turns out to be, it is clear that it is very different from the existence 
which Russell attributes to particulars (1912:12-13).  
     In acknowledgement of this Russell distinguishes between ‘being’ and 
‘existence’. On his account something exists if it is in time, that is, if it is temporally 
ordered in some sense (1912:51). Contrastingly, saying of something that it has 
being or that it subsists does not imply that it is temporally ordered but still posits the 
entity in question (ibid). Straightforwardly then, particulars exist and universals 
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subsist (ibid). Making this distinction satisfies the claim that universals do not exist 
in the same sense as particulars and yet still have some kind of being. Less 
straightforwardly it means that Russell posits two ontological realms: 
 
The world of universals, therefore, may also be described as the world of being. The 
world of being is unchangeable, rigid, exact…The world of existence is fleeting, vague, 
without sharp boundaries, without any clear plan or arrangement, but it contains all 
thoughts and feelings, all data of the sense, and all physical objects… (Russell, 1912:51). 
 
     Russell’s discussion not only leaves opens up the question regarding the 
relationship between the existence of particulars and the subsistence of universals, 
but names further broader questions as to the relationship between the two realms 
that he posits for universals and particulars to respectively inhabit. One such 
question area is whether, on Russell’s account, the existence of particulars is prior 
to the subsistence of universals. Putting this more broadly, given that Russell 
distinguishes between two kinds of existence which are connected in some way it is 
natural, I think, to feel that one must be prior to the other, or somehow depend 
upon the other. Further aspects of Russell’s account provide us with reasons for 
wondering whether he takes the existence of particulars to have metaphysical 
priority.  
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Generally throughout both chapters it’s clear that Russell relies on the notion of a 
particular in order to forward his conception of universals. In this way it seems that 
particulars are prior to universals, at least in order of explanation. Furthermore, as 
we have already seen in the discussion of Russell’s Platonic realism, Russell holds 
that all universals are abstracted from particulars; though some are grasped almost 
immediately from the particular cases while others require a greater degree of 
abstraction (1912:53). It’s not clear whether Russell intends this priority of 
abstraction to imply that universals depend on particulars merely in terms of how 
we comprehend them, or whether he means to say that universals depend for their 
very existence on the particulars from which we abstract them.  
     Russell makes it clear however that he denies the intuition that the familiar 
existence of particulars must necessarily be prior to the more elusive ‘subsisting’ of 
universals. He explicitly insists that the way we conceive of the direction of the 
priority relationship between particular and universal will be affected merely by our 
oscillating preferences (1912:53). The ‘mathematician’ and the ‘builder of 
metaphysical systems’, for example, will have more interest in the subsisting 
eternal, unchanging, world of universals than the ever-fluctuating immediate world 
of sense data and so will consider the existence of universals as primary and the kind 
of existing done by particulars as dependant on it. Russell concludes that the 
priority of explanation between particulars and universals need not have much 
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metaphysical weight since the direction of the dependence is accounted for merely 
by our interests and bias: 
 
According to our temperaments, we shall prefer the contemplation of the one or the 
other. The one we do not prefer will probably seem to us a pale shadow of the one we 
prefer, and hardly worthy to be regarded as in any sense real (Russell, 1912:51). 
 
     He is careful to leave open, however, the question of the relationship between 
the two kinds of existence and with it the intuition that one may ground the other. 
He concludes of the separate realms of existence afforded to the particular and to 
the universal that 
 
…both are real, and both are important to the metaphysician. Indeed no sooner have we 
distinguished the two worlds than it becomes necessary to consider their relations 
(Russell, 1912:51). 
 
     Thus the substance of the relation between existence and subsistence does not lie 
in either’s metaphysical priority, since it is only our own interests and bias that 
make us see one as prior to the other. The remaining question of what the relation 
between the existence of particulars and the subsistence of universals amounts to is 
instead subsumed into the broader question of the relationship between the two 
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ontological realms of ‘existence’ and ‘being’, and this question is simply left open 
by Russell. 
 
Summary 
The two chapters in The Problems of Philosophy that Russell dedicates to his theory of 
universals are ‘The World of Universals’ and ‘On Our Knowledge of Universals’. 
Suspending an analysis of the success of his arguments and the legitimacy of his 
assumptions in these chapters Russell is certainly successful in presenting an 
intuitive and accessible picture of what he takes a universal to be. 
      In The Problems of Philosophy Russell conceives of universals as the common 
essence of particulars. Unlike particulars they do not exist in the world of sense; 
instead we become acquainted with them through a process of abstraction from the 
particulars that partake in them. Their existence is mind independent. They are 
denoted in predicates and relational terms in propositions, and since there is a 
universal denoted by every proposition, universals are involved in all truths. They 
are as common and familiar as the words that denote them in the dictionary. They 
do not exist in the same sense that particulars exist. Rather, they subsist, that is, 
they do not exist in time. They are eternal and they do not change. Universals are 
contrasted with but not reducible to or necessarily dependent upon particulars. It is 
clear that the two entities are deeply interwoven. For Russell, particular and 
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universal make up either side of the same ontological division; they come together 
in his toolkit for explaining and understanding the world. 
 
1.2.2 Universals in On the Relations of Universals and Particulars 
Russell’s On the Relations of Universals and Particulars (1911) is the starting point of 
Ramsey’s article. Indeed Ramsey intentionally borrows from the first line of the 
paper his own opening line and the formulation of the question in dispute: 
 
The purpose of the following paper is to consider whether there is a fundamental division 
of the objects with which metaphysics is concerned into two classes, universals and 
particulars, or whether there is any way of overcoming the dualism (Russell, 1911:1). 
 
The purpose of this paper is to consider whether there is a fundamental division of objects 
into two classes, particulars and universals (Ramsey, 1931:112). 
 
     Again, in this paper Russell does not directly defend his view that there is such 
an ultimate metaphysical distinction but instead sets about articulating and 
developing what he takes to be the main considerations involved in the debate. He 
does so by investigating the main views that one might forward to substantiate the 
difference between particulars and universals and to argue that the distinction is 
ultimate. The four candidates Russell considers are: a distinction in psychological 
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properties; a distinction between things that exist in time and things that do not; a 
distinction in logical properties; and finally a distinction in physical properties. 
 
Psychological difference 
Russell quickly rejects the attempt to distinguish particular and universal by 
employing the psychological distinction that can be drawn between percepts and 
concepts. He acknowledges that there is a distinction between objects that we 
perceive (percepts) and objects that we conceive of (concepts) and that it is intuitive 
to suppose that this distinction aligns with the distinction between objects that are 
particulars and objects that are universals, respectively. He then goes on to give two 
reasons for rejecting this psychological division as a basis for the distinction between 
particular and universal.  
     Russell notes, on the one hand, that basing the particular-universal distinction on 
something psychological would mean that we would be unable to apply it to those 
objects that are not the objects of mental acts (1911:2). In this case, even if we 
granted that the existence of universals was mind-independent; those objects that 
could be called universals would be strangely limited to those that were objects of 
mental acts. It seems clear however that since the distinction between particular 
and universal is one that posits a metaphysical difference - a difference in reality - it 
should neither depend upon on or be limited by the mental acts that occur 
regarding them. 
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The second2 and primary reason that Russell gives for rejecting a psychological 
approach is that distinct psychological acts may not have the same object: 
The distinction of percepts and concepts is too psychological for an ultimate 
metaphysical distinction. Percepts and concepts are respectively the relata of two 
different relations, perception and conception, and there is nothing in their 
definitions to show whether or how they differ (Russell, 1911:2). 
     For instance although I could perceive a giraffe I could also conceive of one, even 
if I had never seen the animal; in this case the giraffe is able to be the object of my 
perception and equally the object of my conception. It is clear from this that the 
distinction between percepts and concepts does not sufficiently align with the 
distinction between particulars and universals which posits a mind-independent 
division in reality.  
 
Existence in time 
Russell then moves to consider a metaphysical distinction, employing again the idea 
of universals as entities that do not exist in time. Particulars contrast with universals 
by existing in time, that is to say, by being distinct from time slices and bearing 
temporal relations to each other such as ‘before’ (1911:2). He observes that the 
distinction can be resisted from both sides; either by maintaining that nothing exists 
                                                          
2
 Though I call it the second reason, as a matter of fact it comes first in the order of Russell’s own text 
(Russell, 1911:2). 
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in time and that any entities that seem to violate this can be shown to be reducible 
to and explained by things with timeless existence; or by maintaining that 
everything exists in time and that things that seem to violate this can be shown to be 
reducible to and explained by things with temporal relations (1911:3). Seemingly 
because of this stand-off Russell does not put much weight behind the distinction 
between ‘things that exist in time’ and ‘things that do not’ as a basis for the 
distinction between particular and universal, and scarcely mentions it again. 
 
Physical difference 
The physical difference that Russell identifies between particulars and universals 
regards their location. The essential characteristic of particulars is that they can only 
occupy a single spatial location, that is to say, they cannot be in more than one place 
at any one time. This contrasts with universals which are not distinguished by their 
locations. The universal ‘blue’, for example, is a single universal even though there 
are many instances of it which occupy distinct spatial locations. Russell takes care in 
the article not to lean on the elusive notion of ‘place’ in order to say that a 
particular cannot be in two places at once while a universal can. For this reason he 
prefers the definition that, for particulars, ‘certain perceptible spatial relations 
imply diversity of their terms’ (1911:24). In other words, if our sense data present 
two instances of the same colour as being in a different location then it implies some 
corresponding different in the objects of the sense data, the objects in reality.  
38 
 
…if I perceive two objects in the field of vision, we must suppose that at least two real 
objects are concerned in causing my perception (Russell, 1911:20).  
 
Logical difference 
Russell’s preferred way of grounding the particular and universal division, however, 
is to employ the logical distinction between the class of subjects and the class of 
predicates and relations. Russell holds that it is intuitive to align these two 
distinctions by defining particulars as those things which can only be subjects or 
terms of relations and which cannot themselves be predicates or relations (1911:5-
6). Anything that is a predicate or relation is instead defined as a universal (1911:6). 
If predication is an ultimate relation, the best definition of particulars is that they 
are entities which can only be the subjects of predicates or terms of relations i.e. 
that they are (in the logical sense) substances. This definition is preferable to one 
introducing space or time, because space and time are accidental characteristics of 
the world with which we happen to be acquainted, and therefore are destitute of 
the necessary universality belonging to purely logical categories (Russell, 1911:23). 
     Russell is careful to note explicitly that when he speaks of ‘subjects’ and 
‘predicates’ or ‘substantives’ and ‘verbs’ this is merely shorthand. His concern is 
not with the grammatical entities themselves but rather with the objects that they 
denote (1911:4). Thus when Russell claims that predicates and relations are 
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universals he should strictly be interpreted as claiming that the objects denoted by 
predicates and relational expressions are universals. 
     On this view then, the central characteristic that is used to separate universals 
from particulars is whether or not something is a predicate or relation (that is to 
say, whether or not an object is denoted by a predicate or relation). If some entity is 
denoted by a predicate or relation then we can say that it’s a universal, and if it is 
not and the entity can only be the subject or term in a relation, then we can say it’s 
a particular. It is therefore important to Russell, if he is to separate particulars and 
universals in this way, that there is a class including predicates and relations and that 
we can articulate the rule by which we include its members and exclude everything 
else.  
     Russell thus lays out some of the concerns that he takes to be involved in 
identifying this class of predicates and relations. Since this class will be a disjunction 
of two classes (the class of predicates and the class of relations) he focuses on 
considering the connection between predicates and relations. In the course of this 
examination Russell leaves the class of relations undisputed; he simply states that he 
will assume that there are relations and that they are distinguished according to the 
number of terms that they take as subjects in the simplest propositions in which 
they occur (1911:4-5). It is the class of predicates that is put under most scrutiny by 
Russell. This is because Russell takes it that predicates denote those universals 
whose existence is most commonly the subject of dispute since ‘universals are 
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generally conceived as common properties of particulars, in fact, as predicates 
(1911:4)’. Therefore, in order to preserve the common notion of a universal 
Russell must identify whether there is a class of predicates.  
     In order to do this Russell observes that we must employ logical analysis 
(1911:4). If it turns out that predicates are not reducible to relations then logical 
analysis of propositions that have a grammatical subject-predicate form will show 
whether there is a term in these propositions that is ‘philosophically as well as 
grammatically intransitive’ (1911:5). Such a term we may call a predicate. If it 
turns out that predicates are reducible to relations then logical analysis will be 
required to inspect those propositions with the misleading appearance of a subject-
predicate proposition to reveal what relations such propositions involve. In this 
case, the question becomes whether among such relations we can identify a relation 
of predication or whether the relations that are yielded by the analysis are simply 
too diverse to support such a division (1911:6). What Russell draws out from both 
scenarios is that we can conclude that there is a class of predicates only if we can 
identify a similar logical functioning of a class of terms which aligns with those 
terms which we would identify as denoting universals. That is to say, when we 
analyse propositions we can identify a logical feature common to all predicates that 
distinguishes them from subjects. 
     As such the debate over whether there are universals is taken by Russell to 
especially hinge on whether we can identify a unified class of predicates that 
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correspond in some way to how universals are commonly conceived of. If such a 
class does not exist then the project to identify a logical feature that will distinguish 
particular and universal will not succeed.  
 
The question whether philosophy must recognise two ultimately distinct kinds of entities, 
particulars and universals, turns… on the question whether there is an ultimate simple 
asymmetric relation which may be called predication, or whether all apparent subject-
predicate propositions are to be analysed into propositions of other forms, which do not 
require a radical difference of nature between the apparent subject and the apparent 
predicate (Russell, 1911:6). 
 
Having identified the question of whether there is an ultimate relation of 
predication as key to establishing universals by logical means, Russell wonders if this 
question could be answered by ‘inspection’ and concludes that although it may be 
possible he cannot understand how it would work. It’s unclear what Russell means 
by ‘inspection’ here and in particular whether he means it to be different from 
analysis. If so, perhaps he means it to be something like collating the results of 
analysis, or perhaps he means more generally, considering whether or not 
grammatical predicates seem to manifest a simple relation of predication in common 
with each other.  At any rate Russell rejects this method in favour of the even 
vaguer method of ‘thing’ analysis: 
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I think… that [the question] can be decided in favour of predication by the analysis of 
things and by our considerations as to spatio-temporal diversity (Russell, 1911:6). 
 
As Russell’s reflections on such an analysis unfold we see that he means a kind of 
conceptual analysis of the word ‘thing’. This leads him into a lengthy defence of the 
irreducibility of ‘things’- particulars - to universals in which Russell articulates the 
physical differences between them. As we have already discussed, this amounts to 
the claim that particulars cannot be in more than one place at one time while 
universals can. Russell takes this defence to be necessary because particulars and 
universals are either side of the same coin, they come together in our attempt to 
explain and categorise the world. In other words, to deny that there are particulars 
is to deny that there is an ultimate particular universal distinction (1911:23). 
     Russell concludes that the difference in spatio-temporal location between 
particular and universal makes the distinction between particular and universal 
‘unavoidable’ but that, as we mentioned, the logical definition of the division is 
superior. He gives a succinct summary of his results including a warning about the 
contingency of the non-logical distinctions that he articulates: 
 
We have thus a division of all entities into two classes: (1) particulars, which enter into 
complexes only as the subjects of predicates or the terms of relations, and, if they belong 
to the world of which we have experience, exist in time and cannot occupy more than one 
43 
 
place at one time in the space to which they belong; (2) universals, which can occur as 
predicates or relations in complexes, exist in time, and have no relation to one place 
which they may not simultaneously have to another (Russell, 1911:24). 
 
Comparison of RUP with PP  
In The Problems of Philosophy (PP) and On the Relation of Universals and Particulars 
(RUP) Russell takes the same kind of considerations to be involved with establishing 
a distinction between particulars and universals. Russell’s discussion of the 
distinction between percepts and concepts in RUP can be seen at some points as an 
extension of his discussion of mind-independence in PP. Both works involve a 
lengthy defence of the irreducibility of particulars to universals. Both bring out the 
distinction between things that exist in time and things that do not, although in 
RUP Russell acknowledges the strong counter-arguments that can be levelled 
against such a distinction. Both acknowledge the physical differences between 
particular and universal, although they play a more central role in RUP. Both also 
bring out the interdependence of particular and universal as an ontological division. 
Finally, both PP and RUP acknowledge a logical distinction that puts on the one 
side universals as defined by the class of predicates and relations and on the other 
particulars as defined by those terms that can only be subjects or terms in relations 
and cannot themselves be predicates or relations. In RUP the strength and 
importance of this way of dividing particular from universal is brought out more 
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fully but so is the difficulty involved in establishing such a definition owing to the 
question of whether there is a fundamental unified relation of predication. In 
general the dependence of the logical distinction upon analysis is a theme in which 
RUP notably exceeds PP. 
 
1.2.3 Universals in Philosophy of Logical Atomism  
The centrality of a logical definition carries over into Russell’s conception of a 
universal in Philosophy of Logical Atomism (1911). In these lectures Russell presents a 
view of the relationship between logic and metaphysics in which he acknowledges a 
great debt to Wittgenstein (1911:177). As part of his view Russell maintains the 
ontological distinction between particular and universal and forwards a conception 
of universals that is distinct from the considerations that preceded it. 
 
Russell’s Logical Atomism 
Let us first sketch some features of Russell’s logical atomism in order to place his 
theory of universals in a wider context. In the lectures, Russell disclaims that he 
intends not so much to defend, as to set out a view that he has arrived at as a result 
of his thinking in the philosophy of mathematics (1918:178-179). He calls this 
theory ‘logical atomism’ which he explains to be the view that analysis will yield 
‘atoms’ from which we may derive a metaphysics (1918:179). In explaining what he 
means by ‘atoms’ Russell brings out how this view is closely connected to a theory 
of universals. 
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The reason that I call my doctrine logical atomism is because the atoms that I wish to arrive 
at as the sort of last residue in analysis are logical atoms and not physical atoms. Some of 
them will be what I call ‘particulars’- such things as little patches of colour or sounds, 
momentary things - and some of them will be predicates or relations and so on (Russell, 
1918:179). 
 
Russell is conceiving of particulars and universals, then, as among those things that 
are given in the results of such an analysis. As such it’s clear that his concern is with 
the atomic case, that is, with the distinction between particular and universal at the 
atomic level, as it had been earlier in RUP’s search for a fundamental relation of 
predication. 
     Throughout the lectures Russell also articulates an idea that is merely implicit in 
PP and RUP, namely, the reason why in the search for a distinction in reality it is at 
all fruitful to turn to language, and in particular the distinction between subjects 
and predicates. This approach relies on the assumption that there is some link 
between language and the world; in other words, that some features of language 
must mirror some features of reality if language is to successfully represent the 
latter. On this assumption identifying a feature of language enables us to make a 
conclusion about reality. For instance if in all atomic propositions we discover a 
distinction of elements into a subject and a term functioning as a predicate or 
relation we can conclude that this must mirror some distinction in reality, thus 
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establishing a division between objects into particulars and universals. Russell is 
explicit that his theory takes there to be such a word-world link. 
 
…in a logically correct symbolism there will always be a certain fundamental identity of 
structure between a fact and the symbol for it; and… the complexity of the symbol 
corresponds very closely with the complexity of the facts symbolised by it…I shall 
therefore in future assume that there in an objective complexity in the world, and that it is 
mirrored by the complexity of propositions (Russell, 1918:197). 
 
Logical Definition 
In the course of the lectures, Russell again defends the irreducibility of particulars 
to universals that he takes to be a rejection of ideas in Hume and Berkeley 
(1918:206). He also once more gives centrality to the logical definition of 
particulars and universals, defending the superiority of logical definition as 
divorcing the truth of the definition from a reliance on empirical facts (1918:199). 
Russell claims that in every atomic fact there is something that is ‘naturally’ 
expressed by a verb, predicate or adjective and something expressed by a ‘proper 
name’ (1918:199-200). He then groups the former as relations and the latter as 
subjects. Russell defines a name as a word that stands for a particular (1918:200).  
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Russell also distinguishes descriptions from names, and throughout the lectures 
Russell emphasises a division between these two kinds of symbol (1918:200-201). 
This is brought out most fully in lecture VI, Descriptions and Incomplete Symbols. Since 
an atomic proposition is one which does not describe particulars but mentions 
them, that is, ‘actually names them’, and since ‘you can only name them by means 
of a name’ Russell concludes that, indeed, the only word that could stand for a 
particular is a name (1918:200). Thus universals are defined by the class of 
predicates and relations in atomic propositions and particulars by the class of names 
in atomic propositions that are terms in relations but not themselves relations 
(1918:199-200). 
 
Asymmetry of dependence 
Russell puts a lot of emphasis on the fact that understanding a name is more 
straightforward than understanding a predicate and from this he derives a deep 
asymmetry between the nature of a particular and the nature of a universal 
(1918:201-206). 
     He begins with the observation that, strictly speaking, we can only understand 
symbols, and we understand a symbol when we know what the symbol stands for 
(1918:205). Russell takes it that to understand a name one has simply to be 
acquainted with the particular that is its meaning3 (1918:201). Therefore, to 
                                                          
3
 This, of course, drastically restricts the category of names to words like ‘this’ and ‘that’ and means that 
the well-worn ‘Socrates’ is really just a truncated description (Russell, 1918:200-201). 
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understand a name, for Russell, is a straightforward process of acquaintance with its 
denotation and does not depend on anything else. 
 
…in order to understand a name for a particular, the only thing necessary is to be 
acquainted with that particular. When you are acquainted with that particular, you have a 
full, adequate, and complete understanding of the name, and no further information is 
required. No further information as to the facts that are true of that particular would 
enable you to have a fuller understanding of the meaning of the name (Russell, 1918:202). 
 
For Russell, then, particulars have an important kind of independence. Our 
understanding of any one particular will rely only on our acquaintance with that 
particular and not on anything else (1918:201-203). In this way, though particulars 
can combine with other elements to form a fact, they do not depend for their 
existence on such facts or indeed on anything else. Particulars are self-contained, 
they are complete. 
 
Particulars have this peculiarity, among the sort of objects that you have to take account of 
in an inventory of the world, that each of them stands entirely alone and is completely 
self-subsistent…That is to say, each particular that there is in the world does not in any 
way logically depend upon any other particular (Russell, 1918:201-202). 
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By contrast, understanding a predicate is a more complicated matter (1918:205). 
Grasping a predicate does not only involve acquaintance with a universal but 
requires acquaintance with how the predicate is used, that is, with what sort of 
thing the predicate will be applied to. Only then can we be said to have understand 
the predicate and to have grasped the universal that it stands for. Russell gives the 
example of understanding the predicate ‘red’. In order to do this we have to 
understand what someone means when they attribute ‘red’ to something. In this 
sense we do not fully understand ‘red’ if we only understand it as an isolated 
abstract property. Rather, we master the predicate when we grasp what ‘being red’ 
amounts to, that is, when we grasp how it would apply to some object. For this 
reason predicates are not independent in the way that names are. To understand a 
predicate is to understand how it will function in a proposition, how it will combine 
with a name to say something about the world. In this sense Russell holds that we 
must grasp not the word ‘red’ but the propositional function ‘x is red’ (ibid). A 
predicate thus has a kind of dependence upon the proposition, a kind of 
incompleteness. That is why he says that to understand a predicate, ‘You have to 
bring in the form of a proposition’ (ibid) 4. 
     Since we can only understand symbols and do so by understanding their 
denotation, it follows that we understand universals by understanding the predicates 
                                                          
4
 Elsewhere Russell is explicit about what he means by a proposition’s form, ‘The form of the proposition 
is what which is in common between any two propositions of which the one can be obtained from the 
other by substituting other constituents for the original ones’ (Russell, 1918:238). 
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that refer to them (1918:201-205). For this reason the dependence of the predicate 
on the proposition transfers to the universal so that, for Russell, a universal cannot 
stand alone in the way that a particular can because understanding it requires us to 
‘bring in the form of a proposition’ (ibid). In this sense they are somehow 
incomplete and depend on the propositions, or the facts that they constitute5. The 
same applies to relations and indeed ‘all those things that are not particulars’ (ibid). 
     Russell therefore identifies a deep logical distinction between predicates and 
names. Predicates depend for their meaning on the form of the proposition in a way 
that names, as independent self-contained elements of a proposition, do not. Since 
predicates are incomplete in a way that names are not, we have identified a 
characteristic that is sufficiently asymmetrical and that we can therefore exploit to 
distinguish predicates from names. Thus Russell identifies a fundamental difference 
in the functioning of expressions in atomic propositions that enables us to ground a 
distinction in reality between particular and universal. Particulars are independent, 
self-standing entities while universals are incomplete and have internal to them the 
form of the propositions that they can enter into.  
 
Comparison of PLA with PP and RUP  
In PLA Russell makes the logical distinction between a particular and a universal, 
which also appears in PP and RUP, more central to his thinking. Relatedly, he 
                                                          
5
 Atomic facts and atomic propositions are used interchangeably here because, for Russell, atomic 
propositions have in them as actual constituents those things in reality which they are about (Russell, 
1918:196, 242).  
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focuses on expressions in atomic propositions. This picks up from Russell’s search 
in RUP for a fundamental relation of predication. PLA, however, contains more 
substantial theory about atomic propositions, their structure, their relation to 
atomic facts, etc. It is Russell’s conception of a universal as incomplete, as 
dependant on the form of the proposition which is most significantly novel to PLA 
and neither PP nor RUP contain any doctrine comparable to this. 
 
1.3 Ramsey’s target 
This section will suggest a solution to the problem identified in §1.1 by employing 
the exposition of Russell given in §1.2. It will do so by articulating exactly what 
Ramsey aims to deny in Universals; separating out the aspects of Russell theory that 
Ramsey is not concerned with from those aspects he is concerned to explicitly 
reject. In order to fully expound the subtly of Ramsey’s contention it will then 
distinguish between different relevant notions, in particular the different kinds of 
incompleteness in play.  
  
1.3.1 Resolving the tension  
This section it will aim to demonstrate that being explicit about the precise target of 
Ramsey’s resolves the apparent tension in his conclusion. 
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Summary so far 
After our long survey of Russell’s theory of universals spanning three works, we can 
return to the problem that initiated this exposition. We noted that Ramsey’s 
conclusion contained two separable strands. On the one hand Ramsey holds that 
that the theory of universals is a muddle and on the other he claims that we cannot 
know a priori whether universals exist. We found these two claims to conflict with 
each other. In particular it seemed that in order to maintain that some sort of 
analysis could establish that there are universals Ramsey would have to drop the 
claim that the theory is universals is simply a muddle. For, no analysis could ever 
establish something that was a muddle; instead the process of analysis would simply 
reveal the way in which the theory was a mistake. However, the claim that the 
properties of namehood and incompleteness have been muddled so as to produce a 
conflation of ideas that has led to the theory of universals is the central contention of 
Ramsey’s paper, as we will see in the following chapter. The other option is that 
Ramsey strengthens his agnosticism regarding the existence of universals to full 
blown scepticism. In this case his conclusion would be that the theory of universals 
results from a mistaken conflation of ideas and, for this reason, universals do not 
exist; they are merely the product of a failure to separate out the properties of two 
very different kinds of symbol. However, this is a much stronger claim that 
Ramsey’s arguments support, as we will also see in the following chapter. In 
summary, although by calling something a muddle Ramsey is rejecting it, it’s not 
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clear what exactly it is that he’s rejecting and what he remains agnostic about, and 
whether both of these positions are consistent with each other. 
     The most striking feature of Russell’s theory of universals that is brought out by 
our lengthy exposition is the diversity of considerations that Russell takes to relate 
to the question of universals. The exposition lets us see the way in which Russell’s 
theory of universals develops over the course of these three works so that while 
some themes remain, by the time we get to PLA some considerations seen to have 
fallen out of Russell’s thinking about universals altogether while some entirely new 
considerations have become central. While all three works attempt to expound the 
nature of universals by examining the suitability of different distinctions to act as a 
basis for establishing a distinction between particular and universal, Russell can be 
seen to increasingly emphasise logical over broadly metaphysical considerations.  
      We saw that while articulating a logical difference between particular and 
universal by defining them using the class, one the one hand, of subjects and, on the 
other hand, the class of predicates and relations is a theme that runs through all 
three works, it is most central to PLA. Similarly, while the irreducibility of 
universals to particulars is a common theme, though it is given most emphasis in PP 
and by PLA is a more of a mere corollary. There are also considerations that Russell 
develops both in PP and RUP such as: the distinction between things that exist in 
time and things that do not; the psychological distinction between percepts and 
concepts; the mind-independence of universals; the physical distinction between 
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universals that can be multiply located and particulars that cannot be in more than 
one place at a time. Russell does not address any of these considerations in PLA. 
Instead his central concern is to articulate a logical distinction between particular 
and universal that likewise does not appear in PP or in RUP. This is the contrast of a 
particular as independent and able to stand alone and a universal as incomplete in 
that it is dependent on the form of the proposition. 
      Therefore, when we identify Russell’s theory of universals as the target of 
Ramsey’s article we must keep in mind that this target is not a single unified theory. 
We can thus understand the different strands in Ramsey’s conclusion as responding 
to different aspects of Russell’s theory. There is a particular conception of a 
universal proposed by Russell that Ramsey’s article aims to outright reject, and 
there are other considerations Russell takes to be relevant to a theory of universals 
regarding which Ramsey is happy to remain on the fence. 
 
Ramsey’s rejection 
There is a very specific consideration in Russell’s theory of universals which inspires 
Ramsey’s paper. This is the conception of a universal as incomplete, as having 
intrinsic to it the form of the proposition and in this way being distinguished from 
the self-subsistent particular. Thus Ramsey does not so much reject Russell’s theory 
of universals in its entirety as he rejects a conception of universals that came to 
dominate Russell’s thinking when he was writing PLA.  
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Ramsey does, however, agree with Russell that particular and universal must be 
distinguished by means of some logical feature, if this is to be a substantial 
ontological division (Ramsey, 1931:113). He also agrees that this logical distinction 
must be found in atomic propositions, so the distinction will amount to some 
asymmetry of the functioning of terms in atomic propositions (1931:120-121).  
     The point at which Ramsey and Russell’s positions diverge regards Russell’s 
realisation of this aim; that is, his conception of a universal as incomplete. Russell’s 
theory involves a conception of particular and universal in a way that posits a logical 
asymmetry between them; one is complete and one is not. This amounts to a 
difference in the functioning of terms in an atomic proposition that relies only on an 
a priori investigation into language. For this reason Ramsey specifically identifies 
Russell’s conception of a universal as incomplete as the subject of the second half of 
his paper: 
 
Only on Mr Russell’s theory will there be an intelligible difference between particular and 
universal, grounded on the necessity for there to be in each fact a copulating term or 
universal corresponding to the need for every sentence to have a verb (Ramsey, 
1931:121). 
 
56 
 
It is this aspect of Russell’s theory of universals that Ramsey will eventually call 
muddled and that his article takes as its target. 
 
Ramsey’s agnosticism 
Having singled out Ramsey’s conception of a universal as incomplete as it occurs in 
PLA we are left with the remaining aspects of Russell’s theory of universals. 
Though we suggested that Ramsey is agnostic regarding some considerations in 
Russell’s theory, it would be wrong to conclude that Ramsey is agnostic to all the 
various other aspects of Russell’s theory. Ramsey, in fact, explicitly rejects most of 
these as well. The reason for this is that Ramsey agrees with the importance that 
Russell’s gives to finding a logical distinction, if not with the realisation of this aim 
that Russell presents. What is most important to realise is that the only thing 
Ramsey rejects, as a muddle between the properties of two different symbols is the 
conception of a universal as incomplete. And though Ramsey does reject some 
other aspects of Russell’s theory he does so for different reasons.  
     Ramsey gives no attention to the distinction between things existing in time and 
things not existing in time or the irreducibility of universals to particulars. Instead, 
Ramsey’s summary of Russell’s view near the beginning of his essay identifies only 
three kinds of distinctions between particular and universal: ‘psychological, 
physical, and logical’ (1931:113). Ramsey quickly rejects the psychological 
distinction between percept and concept for much the same reason that Russell 
57 
 
does in RUP (Russell, 1911:2). He expresses this objection by observing that ‘a 
difference in two mental acts may not correspond to any difference whatever in 
their objects’ (Ramsey, 1931:113).  
     Ramsey’s rejection of the physical distinction between particular and universal - 
so central in RUP - is more nuanced. He separates out the empirical claim that is 
being made when we say that a particular cannot be in more than one place at one 
time while a universal can, pointing out that the empirical facts are not in dispute.  
For when, for instance, Dr Whitehead says that a table is an adjective, and Mr 
Johnston that it is a substantive, they are not arguing about how many places the 
table can be in at once, but about its logical nature (Ramsey, 1931:113). 
     Ramsey concludes that only logical considerations could establish a distinction 
between particular and universal. Although Ramsey rejects Russell’s suggestion for 
such a logical distinction, and along with it the possibility of establishing that 
universals exist for a priori reasons, this still leaves open that other considerations 
could establish an asymmetry in the functioning of terms in an atomic proposition 
that would enable us to ground a theory of universals. Perhaps Ramsey would 
accept, for example, the considerations regarding the multiple occupation of space-
time points if they could be used to argue for the necessity of some logical division 
in atomic propositions. Ramsey does not give us much clue as to what kind of thing 
he has in mind unfortunately, referring as he does only vaguely to ‘actual analysis’ 
(Ramsey, 1931:135), but it’s clear that he does leave a space for the debate to be 
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furthered and perhaps establish the existence of universals, and it is towards these 
legitimate considerations that Ramsey can be seen to remain agnostic. 
 
3.1.3 Ramsey’s target 
We can therefore see that Ramsey’s essay is very specifically directed towards one 
target and as a result does not pronounce on some of the surrounding issues. 
Ramsey’s aim is to reject that universals are incomplete in the way that Russell 
claims they are in PLA. Therefore Ramsey is not so much rejecting a theory of 
universals per se, as he is rejecting a particular conception of a universal; namely, 
that of a universal as incomplete in a sense that a particular is not. This leaves space 
for Ramsey to maintain that universals might exist as long as what we mean by a 
universal has not been arrived at as the result of a muddle. Articulating the variety 
and diversity of the different concerns that Russell takes to be relevant to a theory 
of universals shows how Ramsey can both maintain that universals- as conceived of 
in PLA- are the result of a muddle while remaining agnostic as to whether or not 
some other considerations, collected under ‘actual analysis’, may satisfy him that 
universals exist.  
     Ramsey originally asks whether there is a fundamental division between objects 
into particular and universal. His answer to the question recognises alternatives 
possible ways of conceiving of universals. The conception of a universal as having 
internal to it the form of the proposition, the idea that there are things in the world 
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that are specially incomplete, has resulted from a muddle and thus should be 
rejected. If a theory of universals is to be successfully defended it must not conceive 
of universals in this way, lest it be reduced to a mere confusion. This conclusion 
unifies both the agnostic aspect of Ramsey’s conclusion and the identification of the 
muddle.  
      However, the claim that Ramsey’s real target is the conception of a universal as 
incomplete is still not entirely perspicuous. This is because Ramsey’s denial that 
universals are incomplete in the way Russell presents them to be in PLA is not a 
straightforward rejection of Russell’s position. For Ramsey does not deny that a 
universal possesses all of the features that Russell attributes to them in PLA. Rather, 
Ramsey intends to reject only those features of incompleteness which have become 
muddled with features of names. In order to properly articulate this subtle 
distinction and reach the heart of Ramsey’s contention we need, therefore, to 
distinguish three different types of incompleteness that are in play and use these to 
identify the sense in which Ramsey wants to deny that universals are incomplete. 
 
1.3.2 Three ways of being incomplete 
This section will distinguish the characteristics of these three relevant types of 
incompleteness. To begin with there is the kind of incompleteness that Russell 
attributes to universals in PLA that we have so far identified as the target of 
Ramsey’s paper. Since Ramsey’s rejection of the characteristics Russell attributes to 
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universals denies that universals have some of these characteristic but accepts that 
they have others, to fully articulate Ramsey’s contention we must therefore 
distinguish three types of incompleteness whose features overlap with each other. 
 
PLA-incomplete 
Firstly, there is the kind of incompleteness Russell attributes to universals in PLA 
that we discussed in §1.2.2. We saw that this incompleteness amounted to a kind of 
dependence on the form of the proposition, so that a predicate cannot be fully 
grasped without some understanding of its semantic role in a proposition. As such 
we cannot grasp a universal, like red, unless we grasp what it would be for an object 
to instantiate that universal, that is, unless we grasp what ‘being red’ amounts to. 
For this reason, in Russell’s notation universals are always represented by use of a 
propositional function so that ‘mortal’ does not sufficiently denote the universal of 
mortality. Instead mortality must instead be represented by ‘x is mortal’, making 
explicit the form of the proposition intrinsic to the universal. When I speak of a 
propositional function I mean no more than a function whose values are 
propositions. Propositional functions cannot stand alone because they include a 
variable and because the sameness and distinction of their argument places are 
essential to the functions that they are. Thus, by their nature, propositional 
functions and predicates have the same dependence on the propositions which are 
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their values, and so are the appropriate symbols to represent universals, according 
to Russell. 
     Importantly, a universal is incomplete in this way relative to the particular which 
is complete. Particulars are able to stand alone from a metaphysical point of view, 
which is to say that they have an independence from the propositions they enter into 
that universals do not. To understand a predicate is to understand how it will 
function in a proposition, that is, how it will combine with the other elements in a 
proposition to say something about the world. To understand a name however one 
need only be acquainted directly with the particular that it names. Thus while 
names can of course enter into propositions and combine with other elements to 
form a proposition, they are independent self-contained elements of that 
proposition, and as such the particulars that they denote do not have internal to 
them the form of the proposition in the way that universals do. 
     Russell attributes this incompleteness to predicates in atomic propositions so that 
he is able to exploit the asymmetry between the incompleteness of predicates and 
the completeness of names to argue for a fundamental difference in the functioning 
of expressions in atomic propositions, and hence find a way to ground an objective 
distinction between particular and universal. Russell also holds, less controversially, 
that this distinction holds in complex propositions and hence that complex 
predicates are incomplete in this way. 
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Thus the kind of incompleteness that Russell attributes to universals in PLA is 
characterised primarily as dependent on the form of the proposition as represented 
by employing a propositional function, as an attribute of complex and atomic 
expressions, and as contrasting with independent self-standing particulars. This will 
henceforth be referred to as ‘PLA-incompleteness’. 
 
Russell-incomplete 
There is another kind of incompleteness that is expounded by Russell in PLA. This 
is the incompleteness captured in Russell’s theory of incomplete symbols, which 
Russell devotes an entire lecture to explaining (Russell, 1918:lecture VI). 
Importantly, the theory is presented later on in the lecture series so that the context 
of Russell’s logical atomism is already in place and, in particular, the central role of 
analysis in his approach has already been brought out. Against this backdrop Russell 
introduces an incomplete symbol as a symbol that is complex and can be replaced 
by a simpler paraphrase and, as such, will disappear during the process of analysis 
leaving only simple symbols (1918:244-245). An incomplete symbol then, 
according to Russell, cannot be said to have a simple designation to anything in 
reality but instead has a more complicated relation of meaning; referring by virtue 
of the simple designating symbols that define it (Russell, 1918:245). At some points 
in his paper, Ramsey too explicitly defines incomplete symbols in this way, ‘[an 
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incomplete symbol] has a relation of meaning not to one complex object but to the 
several simple objects that are named in its definition’ (Ramsey, 1931:119).  
     The canonical examples of such incomplete symbols are, of course, class terms 
and definite descriptions such as ‘the author of Waverley’. Such expressions appear 
on the surface to be simple designations - to refer directly to objects - when in fact 
they derive their meaning only from the context of the propositions in which they 
feature. This is, again, a kind of dependence on the form of the proposition, but a 
different kind from that involved in PLA-incompleteness: 
 
These things…which I call incomplete symbols, are things that have absolutely no 
meaning whatsoever in isolation but merely acquire a meaning in context…they are 
aggregations that only have a meaning in use and do not have any meaning in themselves 
(Russell, 1918:253). 
 
Incomplete symbols only give the appearance of being a proper part of a proposition 
and fall out altogether when analysis reveals how the proposition is constructed. 
Therefore, such symbols are not designative elements and are better conceived of as 
logical constructions. Such constructions must ‘be subject to analyses, be taken to 
pieces, pulled to bits, and shown to be simply separate pieces of one fact’(Russell, 
1918:224). 
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Thus the kind of incompleteness that Russell presents in lecture VI of PLA is 
characterised by a complete dependence on the form of the proposition in that such 
complex symbols cannot be defined in isolation but only in the context of a 
proposition. This is because they derive their meaning entirely from the simple 
symbols named in their definition. As such, analysis will reveal that they are not 
among the ultimate building blocks of a proposition and that despite their 
misleading syntactic appearance they do not designate anything in reality. This will 
henceforth be referred to as ‘Russell-incompleteness’. 
 
Ramsey-incomplete 
Lastly there is the kind of incompleteness that Ramsey himself attributes to 
universals. Even at the beginning of his article Ramsey admits that: 
In a sense it might be urged, all objects are incomplete; they cannot occur in facts 
except in conjunction with other objects, and they contain the forms of the 
propositions of which they are constituents (Ramsey, 1931:115). 
     Thus Ramsey accepts that objects have a dependence on the form of the 
proposition. However, counting universals as objects, he then asks; ‘In what way do 
universals do this more than anything else?’ (Ramsey, 1931:115). The extent to 
which Ramsey accepts that universals are incomplete is the extent to which he 
accepts that particulars are also incomplete. He takes it that the dependence on the 
form of the proposition is no more a characteristic of an atomic predicate than it is 
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of an atomic name. That is to say that when we examine what this ‘dependence’ 
amounts to we find it to apply no more to universals than to predicates: 
There is a sense in which any object is incomplete; namely that it can only occur in a 
fact by connection with an object or objects of a suitable type; just as any name is 
incomplete, because to form a proposition we have to join to it certain other names 
of suitable type (Ramsey, 1931:121). 
     The sense in which a predicate is dependent on the form of the proposition is not 
so much that it literally contains a gap - a variable - but rather that it has the 
potential to combine with other words to form a proposition. This is just to say that 
a predicate has a certain grammar; that it has internal to it its semantic role, which 
of course must also be true of names and all expressions that can together form a 
proposition. Ramsey quotes proposition 2.0122 of Wittgenstein’s Tractatus to this 
effect: 
 
The thing is independent, in so far as it can occur in all possible circumstances, but this 
form of independence is a form of connection with the atomic fact, a form of dependence. 
(It is impossible for words to occur in two ways, alone and in the proposition) 
(Wittgenstein, 1922:33). 
 
Here there is no distinction made between different kinds of expressions in a 
proposition because all words have to be seen to function in this way. At the atomic 
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level the grammatical categories of subject and predicate are understood 
interdependently; to grasp a name is to grasp that it’s the sort of thing that 
combines with a predicate; and to grasp a predicate is to grasp that it’s the sort of 
thing that combines with a name. We see this feature in Frege’s context principle 
that holds that only in the context of a proposition does a word have meaning 
(Frege, 1884:§60,62). Again this principle encompasses all expressions and as such 
does not make a distinction between subject and predicate. 
     Therefore, the kind of incompleteness that Ramsey attributes to universals is 
characterised by a dependence on the form of the proposition, but only in such a 
way as does not produce any asymmetry between predicates and names in atomic 
propositions. Both universals and particulars have as internal to them the functional 
role that they play when combined with other expressions in a proposition; they are 
both as complete and as incomplete as each other. This will henceforth be referred 
to as ‘Ramsey-incompleteness’. 
 
Ramsey’s view of incompleteness 
With these three kinds of incompleteness in place we can now fully articulate 
Ramsey’s contention. In short, Ramsey’s view is that all the elements in atomic 
propositions are Ramsey-incomplete and that anything that is PLA-incomplete is 
also Russell-incomplete. 
 
67 
 
This is to say that, according to Ramsey, there is a sense in which the elements in 
atomic propositions are incomplete (Ramsey, 1931:115,121). They have intrinsic 
to them their potential for combination with other elements of a proposition. 
Vitally, however, this incompleteness is not asymmetric; predicates have it no more 
than subjects, it is equally a feature of all expressions. For this reason the 
incompleteness of terms in atomic propositions cannot be a basis upon which we 
establish a logical distinction between particular and universals since it provides no 
distinction between the functioning of elements in an atomic proposition.  
     On the other hand Ramsey holds that some terms are PLA-incomplete, in 
particular complex predicates (Ramsey, 1931:123,129). Thus complex predicates 
have a dependence on the form of the proposition that subjects do not. However, 
Ramsey (1931:119,131,134) takes it that such expressions are also Russell-
incomplete in that they do not correspond directly to anything in reality and instead 
derive their meaning entirely from the simple symbols that define them. Therefore, 
although complex predicates, and other such terms that are PLA-incomplete, 
present us with a sufficiently asymmetric division between the functioning of 
subject and predicate, they do not link up with reality in the right way so that we 
cannot infer from them a metaphysical distinction between particular and universal. 
     This is not to say, of course, that PLA-incompleteness is the same as Russell-
incompleteness. Both are distinct theories; in particular Ramsey does not claim that 
an expression that is PLA-incomplete will necessarily have all the same features as 
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one that is Russell-incomplete. An expression that is PLA-incomplete may not, for 
example, have a misleading syntactic appearance. The point is simply that anything 
that is PLA-incomplete does not refer directly to anything in reality just as Russell-
incomplete expressions fail to do. They are merely logical constructions that will 
disappear upon analysis and so the asymmetry of dependence that there is between 
complex predicates and subjects will not be able to ground a distinction between 
particular and universal. 
     We may put Ramsey’s contention like this. To ground a distinction between 
particular and universal we need to articulate a logical difference in the functioning 
of two kinds of terms. Russell believes that we can do so by attending to a 
difference in dependence on the form of the proposition, that is, a difference in 
incompleteness. However, the only kind of incompleteness that is asymmetric 
(PLA-incompleteness) is not a feature of symbols that correspond to anything in 
reality and therefore cannot ground an objective ontological division between 
objects. There is a kind of incompleteness (Ramsey-incompleteness) that exists 
among expressions that do refer to reality and could be used to ground such a 
distinction, but it is not asymmetric and is instead a property of all words. Thus 
Ramsey holds that no object in reality, no universal, is PLA-incomplete. 
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1.4 Conclusion to chapter one 
We began by saying that Russell was the target of Ramsey’s essay, and in particular 
his theory of universals. When we explored Russell’s theory of universals we found 
it to contain many different strands and considerations. We then identified the 
specific aspect of Russell’s theory of universals that Ramsey wanted to reject, that 
is, Russell’s view that universal are incomplete; that they have internal to them the 
form of the propositions that they can enter into. This satisfied the worry we had 
regarding the apparent tension in Ramsey’s conclusion which, on the one hand, 
rejected universals as muddled and, on the other hand, remained agnostic as to 
whether universals exist. We can now see his conclusion as rejecting the conception 
of universals as incomplete while remaining agnostic as to whether other 
considerations could succeed in establishing a logical distinction that would ground 
the desired ontological division. In the preceding section we saw that that Ramsey’s 
denial of incompleteness amounts to a denial that expressions that refer to reality 
directly have a dependence on the form of the proposition that is asymmetric. This is 
a denial that a distinction between complete and incomplete expressions could 
function as the logical distinction between the elements in an atomic proposition 
that Ramsey and Russell both seek. 
     When we enquire deeper into the aims and conclusions of Ramsey’s essay it 
becomes apparent that it is very specifically directed towards one target and as such 
does not pronounce on some of the surrounding issues or fully engage with some of 
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the wider views in play. Though the target at first seemed to be Russell it is better 
to think of Ramsey’s target as a specific view that manifests itself in Russell’s work 
in PLA. Ramsey even predicts towards the end of his article that Russell would 
accept his diagnosis that a certain aspect of his theory of universals is a muddle 
(Ramsey, 1931:131). Thus Ramsey’s target is rather a conception of predicates as 
being incomplete in a way that contrasts asymmetrically with the completeness of 
subjects. This is the linguistic analogy of the view that universals are somehow 
essentially incomplete in a way that particulars are not. Against this view Ramsey 
holds that no term in an atomic proposition, and no entity, is PLA-incomplete. The 
real opponent of Ramsey’s paper, therefore, is any view that manifests a conception 
of universals violating this position. 
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 Chapter two  
 
Having identified the view that Ramsey intends to counteract in his paper, this 
chapter will expound how the arguments of Universals are structured towards 
challenging this target. It will first lay out the indirect way in which Ramsey’s 
arguments work against the view that universals are PLA-incomplete by using a 
balance of argumentation and diagnosis. It will then detail the mechanisms of 
Ramsey’s various arguments within this framework, demonstrating how they are 
each intended to contribute towards the eventual rejection of PLA-incompleteness 
in the world. 
 
§2.1 Ramsey’s rejection 
We saw in the preceding chapter that Ramsey wants to reject the view that 
universals are PLA-incomplete. This section will consider the way in which 
Ramsey’s article works towards this end. It will first expound how far Ramsey 
counteracts the opposing view, before setting out the arguments he employs to do 
so.  
 
2.1.1 An indirect attack 
Ramsey does not reject the view that universals are PLA-incomplete in a 
straightforward way. At the beginning of his article, after expounding Johnston’s 
view of a universal and Russell’s view of a universal in PLA, Ramsey explains that 
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he does not aim to directly refute the opposing view, observing that although 
‘[n]either of these theories seems entirely satisfactory’ they are such that ‘neither 
could be disproved’ (Ramsey, 1931:114). Instead Ramsey aims to counter the 
positions of Russell and Johnston by offering an alternative position by ‘rejecting 
something assumed as obvious by both disputants’ (1931:116). This he identifies to 
be the assumption that in every proposition we can identify a subject and a predicate 
functioning in different ways (1931:116). 
     As such, Ramsey’s position is a subtle one: though he does not directly falsify the 
opposing view he instead attacks the reasons that have led to it. In this way Ramsey 
aims to cut off the opposing position at its source. Additionally, from the beginning 
of the article Ramsey carefully sets up the dialectic so as to put the burden of proof 
onto his opponent. Rather than setting out to prove that there is no difference 
between a particular and a universal Ramsey takes up a method of Socratic 
questioning against his opponent. 
 
What then, I propose to ask, is the difference between a particular and a universal? What 
can we say of one that will not also be true of the other? (Ramsey, 1931:112) 
 
Approaching the issue from this direction means that Ramsey is not required to 
directly establish that universals cannot be PLA-incomplete but instead requires his 
opponent to provide some reason for thinking that universals are PLA-incomplete. 
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Ramsey then considers and rejects the reasons that his opponent could provide to 
this effect. As part of this process he offers a diagnosis as to why universals have 
been commonly and mistakenly conceived of as PLA-incomplete. He concludes that 
the reasons for conceiving of universals as PLA-incomplete are fallacious and as such 
any theory that has conceived of universals in this way ought to be rejected. 
     As such Ramsey’s article is a carefully intertwined balance of argumentation and 
diagnosis that is constructed to reject the view that universals are PLA-incomplete 
by establishing that none of the reasons for conceiving of universals in this way are 
good reasons. This statement of Ramsey’s conclusion is deliberately ambiguous 
between two readings. We could interpret it in a strong sense as holding that 
universals cannot be conceived of in this way, so that there cannot be any possible 
reason for conceiving of universals as PLA-incomplete. We could also interpret it as 
the weaker claim to conclude that, of the reasons that Ramsey considers, none is a 
good reason for conceiving of universals as PLA-incomplete, though there might be 
alternative satisfactory reasons for supporting this view. Ramsey’s conclusion falls 
somewhere between the two of them. On the one hand Ramsey’s diagnosis acts to 
identify the actual reasons that universals are taken to be PLA-incomplete and then 
Ramsey’s arguments serve to expose the fault in these reasons. As such Ramsey 
does remain agnostic towards the possibility that some kind of analysis could 
establish that universals exist but he categorically rejects that there could be any 
74 
 
possible a priori reason that such universals would be PLA-incomplete (Ramsey, 
1931:135).  
     Furthermore although it is possible that considerations bracketed under ‘actual 
analysis’ might provide support for Russell’s logical definition of particular and 
universals it seems unlikely that they would (Ramsey, 1931:135),. For it would be 
some kind of unprecedented happy accident if a theory that resulted from a muddle 
regarding one type of consideration happened to be independently established by 
considerations of a completely different kind. Therefore, although Ramsey is happy 
to admit that he is agnostic as to whether same view can be established by other non 
a priori considerations he points out that ‘there is no strong presumption in its 
favour’ (Ramsey, 1931:135). 
     Ramsey’s diagnosis, then, acts to identify the actual reasons that universals are 
taken to be PLA-incomplete and as such is an essential part of his argument. With 
the diagnosis in place Ramsey’s arguments can focus on attacking only these reasons 
and need not directly prove the stronger conclusion that there is no possible reason 
for universals to be conceived of in this way. This is important because, as we saw, 
Ramsey notes the theory that universals are PLA-incomplete has no inherent 
contradiction, and as such cannot be directly disproved; it’s just wrong, according 
to Ramsey (1931:114).  
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2.1.1 Ramsey’s diagnosis  
Since all the argumentation in the essay is directed towards the diagnosis in this 
way, in order to make the mechanisms of Ramsey’s article explicit we must begin at 
the end of Ramsey’s article where he gives his diagnosis for why universals have 
come to be conceived of as PLA-incomplete. His diagnosis is key to the refutation 
of Ramsey’s opponent as it reveals that the reasons that have led to the guilty 
conception of a universal are the result of a confusion between two different kinds 
of symbol.  
  
The result of replacing names of these individuals in propositions by variables [the 
mathematical logician] then calls functions, irrespective of whether the constant part of the 
function is a name or an incomplete symbol, because this does not make any difference to 
the class which the function defines. The failure to make this distinction has led to these 
functional symbols, some of which are names and some incomplete, being treated all alike 
as names of incomplete objects or properties, and is responsible for that great muddle the 
theory of universals (Ramsey, 1931:134). 
      
    We saw already that there is a sense in which Ramsey accepts that all names are 
incomplete (i.e. Ramsey-incomplete) and so when Ramsey distinguishes names 
from incomplete symbols there is a different kind of incompleteness that he has in 
mind. To employ the terminology that is already in play we may alter the above 
passage: 
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The result of replacing names of these individuals in propositions by variables the 
mathematical logician then calls functions, irrespective of whether the constant part of the 
function is a name or a Russell-incomplete symbol, because this does not make any 
difference to the class which the function defines. The failure to make this distinction has 
led to these functional symbols, some of which are names and some Russell-incomplete, 
being treated all alike as names of PLA-incomplete objects or properties, and is responsible 
for that great muddle the theory of universals (Sullivan, 2009:2). 
 
Ramsey blames the neglect of the important distinction between names and Russell-
incomplete symbols on the mathematician’s interest in classes, so that different 
symbols have been treated like the classes that define them (Ramsey, 1931:131).  
As we saw before, this has resulted in philosophically different kinds of symbol, in 
particular names and Russell-incomplete symbols, being treated as the same kinds 
of function. The failure to separate the distinct properties of each symbol has led to 
the impression that there are symbols that have both the property of name-hood and 
the property of incompleteness. This has given rise to the idea that there are PLA-
incomplete symbols that stand for objects in reality which must be similarly PLA-
incomplete corresponding to that which names them. Herein lays the root of the 
conception of universals as such an object; as incomplete in the way that Ramsey 
wants to reject. 
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2.1.3 How the arguments are directed by the diagnosis 
We can articulate two premises that Ramsey contests: 
A*. Complex predicates are names  
B*. Simple predicates are PLA-incomplete  
Contrasting with these are two contentions Ramsey does not dispute: 
A. Simple predicates are names6 
B. Complex predicates are PLA-incomplete 
     With these in place we can express Ramsey’s diagnosis as claiming that 
incompleteness enters into the picture as a feature of complex symbols (B) as does 
name-hood as a feature of simple predicates (A). Simple and complex predicates are 
then treated as the propositional functions that may define the same class, and in 
this way are assimilated into a single class of functions. The incompleteness of 
complex predicates then gets (incorrectly) transferred to simple predicates (B*) 
and, likewise, the property of name-hood is transferred to complex ones (A*). This 
gives the impression that there are incomplete entities corresponding to incomplete 
predicates, while in Ramsey’s view incompleteness is a feature of symbols. 
     Ramsey’s diagnosis of the reasons for which universals have come to be 
conceived of as PLA-incomplete focuses his argumentation towards rejecting A* 
and B*. In order for Ramsey to conclude that no object in the world is PLA-
incomplete he must reject both of these contested premises.  
                                                          
6
 The premises concern predicates because it is accepted that these are the terms that potentially refer to 
universals. 
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This is because both A* and B* could be used to infer that there are objects in the 
world that are PLA-incomplete. Since Ramsey accepts that complex predicates are 
PLA-incomplete (B) he must deny that complex predicates denote anything in 
reality, since if they did what they would name would be correspondingly PLA-
incomplete. Similarly, since Ramsey accepts that simple predicates are names (A) 
then he must deny that simple predicates are PLA-incomplete or else this would 
deliver the result that we could infer from the incompleteness of simple predicates 
the incompleteness of the simple universals they name. Therefore, Ramsey must 
deny both that complex predicates are names (A*) and that simple predicates are 
PLA-incomplete (B*) since if either of these premises held it would offer a 
legitimate reason to conclude that there must be incompleteness in the world, and 
more specifically that universals are PLA-incomplete. 
     The majority of Ramsey’s paper, after his extended introduction, therefore 
builds up different arguments that confront A* and B*. Ramsey first denies that 
complex predicates are names by using the incomprehensible trinity argument and 
the argument from definition (Ramsey, 1931:117-120). These two arguments 
reject A* in a strong sense, claiming that such a position can be shown to be absurd. 
Ramsey then moves onto the more lengthy rejection of the view that simple 
predicates are PLA-incomplete, considering two arguments that Russell might make 
in defence of this position (Ramsey, 1931:122-132). The first holds that there is a 
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difference that can be ‘felt’ between subject and predicate and which is captured by 
Russell’s theory that the simple predicate is especially incomplete. The second is 
that Russell’s symbolism, which represents all predicates as incomplete by using a 
propositional function, is the most convenient and therefore ‘correspond[s] to 
reality closer than any other’ (Ramsey, 1931:122). Ramsey’s arguments here serve 
to reject B* only in a weaker sense; he offers us sufficient reason only to conclude 
that simple predicates do not have to be conceived of as PLA-incomplete. However, 
together with his diagnosis, his arguments do enable us to conclude in a stronger 
sense that there is no a priori reason for conceiving of simple predicates as 
incomplete and in this way he offers Russell a way out of the muddle that he has 
made. His assertion that simple predicates are Ramsey-incomplete (and in this way 
are no different from simple subjects) is at the same time a denial that they are PLA-
incomplete.  
     As we saw before Ramsey therefore leaves space for some non-a priori 
considerations grouped under ‘actual analysis’ to possibly establish that the forms of 
atomic propositions were such that they would support Russell’s logical definition 
of universals using the class of predicates and relations (Ramsey, 1931:135). But of 
course such considerations would involve no mention of a universal as intrinsically 
incomplete and dependent upon the form of the proposition, that is, they would not 
involve the conception of a simple predicate or a universal as PLA-incomplete.  
 
80 
 
2.2 Ramsey’s arguments 
Having identified the subtleties of Ramsey’s conclusion and the way in which his 
arguments are intended to support it we can now turn to expounding the arguments 
themselves. This section will navigate the particulars of the incomprehensible trinity 
argument, the argument from definition, the felt difference argument, and the 
argument from convenience of symbolism, in order to show how they are intended 
to support Ramsey’s diagnosis by rejecting A* and B*. 
 
2.2.1 The incomprehensible trinity argument 
This is the most notorious of Ramsey’s arguments. Since it will be the subject of 
further scrutiny in chapter three we require for now only a minimal exposition. As 
we saw, the aim of this argument is to reject A*, that complex predicates are 
names. Ramsey explicitly identifies the target of the argument as the theory that in 
compound propositions we can discern complex predicates that name complex 
universals (Ramsey, 1931:118). The argument is a reductio ad absurdum and as such it 
aims to demonstrate the view in question leads to absurd conclusions and hence 
should be rejected.   
    The incomprehensible trinity argument is short enough to quote in full; 
 
In order to make things clearer let us take a simpler case, a proposition of the form aRb; 
then this theory will hold that there are three closely related propositions; one asserts that 
the relation R holds between the terms a and b, the second asserts the possession by a of 
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the complex property of ‘having R to b’, while the third asserts that b has the complex 
property that a has R to it. These must be three different propositions because they have 
different sets of constituents, and yet they are not three propositions, but one proposition, 
for they all say the same thing, namely that a has R to b. So the theory of complex 
universals is responsible for an incomprehensible trinity, as senseless as that of theology 
(Ramsey, 1931:118). 
 
     Regarding the three ‘closely related’ propositions in the argument, we may 
isolate two distinct assumptions which Ramsey claims the opposing view is 
committed to: 
(Unity Premise): the propositions are the same because they ‘say the same 
thing’. 
(Trinity Contention): the propositions are three different propositions 
because they ‘have different sets of constituents’.7 
In order for the argument to be successful as a reductio ad absurdum, Ramsey must 
also be granted the following assumptions.  
     First, it must be that the unity premise and the trinity contention are sufficiently 
contradictory. This is satisfied by the incompatible claims that they make regarding 
the number of propositions in question. 
     Secondly, it must be that the opposing view is genuinely committed to the unity 
premise. The claim that the propositions are the same because they have the same 
                                                          
7
 We will see in §3.1.1 why this is the trinity contention and not the trinity premise. 
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meaning is set up to be intuitive, although strictly speaking Ramsey owes us an 
account of what a proposition is, MacBride notes (2005:84). The idea is that the 
opposing view is committed to the unity premise in so far as everyone should be. 
Chapter three will identify a deeper reason for why the unity premise is essential 
but for now it’s enough to grant Ramsey that the premise is couched in sufficiently 
intuitive terms. 
     Thirdly, it must be that the opposing view is genuinely committed to the trinity 
contention. Ramsey intends the trinity contention to be derived from the very 
essence of the view he disputes. On the opposing view, complex predicates stand 
for complex universals. Ramsey couples this with the observation that given a single 
complex proposition we can identify different complex predicates, different ways of 
splitting it up. In his example ‘aRb’ we can identify three candidates for the 
predicate of the proposition: ‘xRy’, ‘xRb’ and ‘aRx’ (Ramsey, 1931:118). These 
three predicates are distinct and so must be part of three distinct propositions. 
However, this leaves the opposing view to explain how these three distinct 
propositions are connected and brings the view into tension with the unity premise. 
     It’s a much more difficult matter to say whether Ramsey’s opponent is 
committed to the trinity contention. It’s one thing to say that there are three 
different propositions, but another to claim that this is due to their being three 
different sets of constituents. This claim that distinct parts entail distinct 
propositions is not a straightforward one. It relies on assumptions about the 
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combination of the elements of a proposition, about the uniqueness of a 
proposition’s constituents and about the structure of propositions in general. These 
issues will be taken up and considered in depth in chapter three. 
 
2.2.2 The argument from definition 
The argument from definition is a puzzling argument that acts as a kind of 
supplement to the incomprehensible trinity argument, applying the same 
considerations to an important concrete case, that of the process of definition. 
Ramsey observes that we may wish to represent ‘aRb’ by a more convenient symbol 
such as ‘ b’. We are able to do this by the process of definition, defining ‘ x = aRx’ 
(Ramsey, 1931:118). Ramsey contends that the opposing view either violates this 
process of definition or else is unable to name complex universals or to have any 
reason to postulate them. 
     Ramsey derives the reductio ad absurdum by asking whether or not ‘ ’ is now the 
name for the complex universal aRx. He argues that if the proponent of complex 
universals concedes that ‘ ’ is a name then ‘ b’ will be a subject predicate 
proposition distinct from the relational proposition ‘aRb’. Since ‘aRb’ does not 
contain the name ‘ ’ then ‘ b’ and ‘aRb’ will not have the same meaning. This, 
however, violates the hypothesis that they are respectively definiendum and 
definiens. To hold such a view, then, would counteract the vital process of 
definition since it is essential to this process that the definiendum and definiens are 
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equivalent and substitutable. Here the incomprehensible trinity argument feeds 
back in, generating this time as an incomprehensible duality. 
     Alternatively, if the proponent of complex universals holds that ‘ ’ is not the 
name of the complex universal then Ramsey asks how the complex universal could 
ever become the ‘object of our contemplation’. After all, ‘ ’ is the best candidate 
to be the name of the complex universal; it is hard to see what other arbitrary 
symbol would be more apt at naming it. And without employing its name, Ramsey 
asks, how are we able to postulate or speak of an entity? (Ramsey, 1931:119).  
     Therefore the argument from definition presents us with a dilemma. Either we 
maintain a view that is vulnerable to the previous reductio ad absurdum or we are 
seemingly unable to speak of complex universals. In order to establish the dilemma, 
however, the argument from definition makes some assumptions. Firstly, Ramsey 
exploits the connotation on the word ‘name’ to mean a simple name: much of the 
force of the argument trades on this. Furthermore, as a supplement to the 
incomprehensible trinity argument the argument from definition rests on the 
assumption already identified that if propositions have distinct constituents then 
they are different propositions. Articulating these assumptions makes it easier to see 
why Ramsey states that the proponent of complex universals will be forced to the 
absurd conclusion that ‘aRx’ and ‘ x’ do not mean the same thing if they admit that 
‘ ’ is a name. Ramsey takes them to claim that ‘ ’ is a simple name and so since 
‘aRx’ does not contain an equivalent simple name but only a complex predicate they 
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must therefore be two different propositions since they have different parts. It follows 
that ‘aRx’ and ‘ x’ are not equivalent, contrary to the definition in the hypothesis. 
     The argument from definition does however make points not already apparent in 
the incomprehensible trinity argument. Both horns of the dilemma serve an 
unapparent purpose that in some way supports the rejection of A*. The first horn of 
the dilemma is intended specifically to strengthen the unity premise. It does so by 
elucidating a context in which it is essential that the unity premise holds, in this way 
substantiating it beyond a mere intuition. Underlying the process of definition is the 
possibility that two propositions with different parts can nonetheless be considered 
to have the same meaning. Therefore maintaining the unity premise in any given 
case is essential to the process of definition, and in bringing this out Ramsey means 
to highlight the importance of the intuitive unity premise. 
     The second horn of the dilemma is intended to direct us away from the idea that 
every expression we might identify must be a simple designation of something in 
reality. When Ramsey says that unless ‘ ’ is the name of the complex universal we 
could never come to grasp it, he is asking how we can grasp a complex universal if it 
is not denoted by a simple name. Put like this we can see that his question is 
rhetorical (Sullivan, 2010:17-18). By Ramsey’s own lights we can, of course, 
understand expressions that are not names: we can grasp the meaning of incomplete 
symbols. But Ramsey has in mind here the kind of incomplete symbol that describes 
reality by virtue of the simple symbols that make it up, and does not directly 
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correspond to anything in reality in other words, that is, a Russell-incomplete 
symbol. We see this when he finishes his argument with an ontological question, 
‘And then what reason can there be to postulate the existence of this thing?’ 
(Ramsey, 1931:119). With this horn of the dilemma Ramsey is pushing us towards 
the admission that something’s possibly being an ‘object of our contemplation’ 
doesn’t make it an object in the world (ibid). 
 
2.2.3 The felt difference argument 
The felt difference argument is the first of the arguments that Ramsey presents to 
reject the view that simple predicates are PLA-incomplete (B*). Ramsey admits that 
there does seem to be a difference that one can feel between subject and predicate, 
such as between John and wisdom. Surely John is in some sense more independent 
than wisdom, which instead depends on John and other admirable individuals for its 
instantiation (Ramsey, 1931:122-123). Continuing his method of Socratic 
questioning Ramsey then asks what this feeling might consist of and where it might 
be rooted. After locating its source Ramsey considers whether the substance of this 
deep intuition supports the view that simple predicates are PLA-incomplete. He 
concludes that the source of the felt difference shows no essential division between 
subject and predicate and no reason to conclude that simple predicates are PLA-
incomplete. We see again Ramsey’s strategy of rejecting a theory by providing a 
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diagnosis of its origins that reveals the way in which it is mistaken or, in this case, 
unessential. 
 
The source of the felt difference 
Ramsey begins his investigation into the roots of the feeling that there is a difference 
between particular and universal with the observation that ‘Socrates is wise’ is not 
an atomic proposition (1931:122). He emphasises that the difference we feel 
regards terms like ‘Socrates’ and ‘wisdom’ which are parts of complex propositions 
and which according to Ramsey are ‘not the names of objects but incomplete 
symbols’ (1931:123). We see here Ramsey’s separation of symbols that are names, 
from symbols that are Russell-incomplete. His aim, however, is to deny that simple 
predicates are PLA-incomplete (B*). Furthermore Ramsey accepts that complex 
predicates are PLA-incomplete, as we saw (B). This means that the aim of the felt 
difference investigation is to establish whether a difference that is felt between two 
kinds of incomplete symbol is an essential logical difference. This is because only a 
logical difference between complex symbols would be sufficient for us to infer a 
distinction between complete subjects and PLA-incomplete predicates in atomic 
propositions.   
     Ramsey considers when it might arise that subject and predicate, or more 
exactly, the two kinds of incomplete symbols in question, are considered in 
isolation as opposed to considering the proposition of which they are a part. 
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Agreeing with Wittgenstein, he identifies this as the context of generalisation 
(Ramsey, 1931:123). As we have seen, an incomplete symbol cannot be defined 
except in conjunction with other symbols (1931:130). Such a symbol is defined by 
its range, by what symbols can replace it and by what symbols it can replace. For 
this reason incomplete symbols are used to identify common patterns in 
propositions and so to group together some set of propositions in order to say 
something about all of them, that is, in order to generalise over them. We use 
‘Socrates’ to collect together all those propositions in which the occurrence of 
‘Socrates’ is a common part, such as, ‘Socrates is a man’, ‘Socrates is both famous 
and clever’, ‘Socrates is not dead’, etc. These propositions then become the range 
of a generalisation such as ‘  Socrates’ or ‘Socrates is something’. Similarly we use 
‘wisdom’ to gather a range of propositions that include the occurrence of ‘wise’, 
such as, ‘Socrates is wise’, ‘Owls are wise’, ‘Neither of the brothers is wise’, etc. 
These are the values of ‘  wise’.  However, Ramsey points out, we typically use 
‘wise’ to collect a narrower range of propositions, ‘Socrates is wise’, ‘Plato is 
wise’, ‘I am wise’, etc., which have in common not only their occurrence of ‘wise’ 
but also the proposition’s form, ‘x is wise’, where x is a simple subject (Ramsey, 
1931:124). 
     Ramsey attributes the felt difference between particulars and universals to this 
divergence. While the subject ‘Socrates’ can be used to delineate one class of 
propositions, the predicate ‘wise’ can be used to delineate two: a wide range 
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parallel to the range given by ‘Socrates’ and a narrower range that has not only 
‘wise’ as a common element but the shape of the original proposition of which 
‘wise’ was a part (ibid). Having identified this as the source of the felt difference 
Ramsey immediately moves on to ask what causes this asymmetry: what reason, or 
more exactly what kind of reason, is there to recognise contrasting ranges 
determined by subject and predicate, and what does this reason tell us about the 
nature of the terms in atomic propositions?  
 
The ranges made symmetrical 
In order to answer whether the difference in the ranges determined by two sorts of 
incomplete symbols is a ‘real difference’ Ramsey considers whether it’s possible to 
make the ranges of generalisation symmetrical (1931:125). If the asymmetry 
between the ranges of generalisation is due to the kind of logical difference between 
the incomplete symbols we seek then it will be impossible for the ranges to be made 
symmetrical. Therefore if Ramsey is able to show that it is merely possible to make 
the ranges symmetrical then he can conclude that the asymmetry is not due to a 
logical distinction between subject and predicate at the atomic level.  
     Ramsey sets about attempting to make the ranges of generalisation determined 
by ‘Socrates’ and ‘wisdom’ symmetrical, asking, ‘Is this impossible, or is it merely 
that we never in fact do it?’ (1931:125). He offers an account of how the subject 
might be used to construct a further range analogous to the narrow range that we 
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found to be most naturally determined by the predicate. Recall that the narrow 
range of the predicate had not only ‘wise’ as a common element but also the form 
of the proposition, so that while the wider range gathered all the propositions that 
included an occurrence of ‘wise’, the narrow range gathered a proper subset of the 
wider range which also attributed wise to a simple subject, i.e. the values of ‘x is 
wise’. ‘Neither of the brothers is wise’, for instance, is included in the wide range, 
‘  wise’, but not in the narrow range, ‘x is wise’, since ‘neither of the brothers’ is 
not a simple subject. Ramsey’s suggestion is that we first delineate a subset of 
properties called qualities, ‘the idea being roughly that only a simple property is a 
quality (1931:125)’. Say for instance that ‘red’ and ‘green’ are colour qualities, 
then ‘red or green’ would be a complex property but not a quality. Using these 
qualities we can then identify a narrow range for subjects that forms a proper subset 
of the range of propositions gathered by the values of ‘  Socrates’. This narrow 
range will also have in common the form of the proposition ‘Socrates is q’ where q 
is a quality. ‘Socrates is neither red nor green’, for instance, will be included in the 
wide range, ‘  Socrates’, but not in the narrow range, ‘Socrates is q’, since ‘neither 
red nor green’ is not a quality. 
    Thus, by delineating qualities from properties we are able to identify a narrow 
range given by the subject. In this case, both subject and predicate determine a wide 
range and a narrow range in connection with generalisation. If we were to 
systematically carry out this identification of qualities, therefore, there would be no 
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asymmetry between subject and predicate and we would no longer feel there to be 
any difference between them. 
     Johnston, however, questions whether such a delineation of qualities from 
properties could be systematically carried out, since there is no means to settle what 
properties are simple properties which would qualify as qualities (1931:126). In 
response to this Ramsey points again to the fact that we are dealing with complex 
symbols and not ‘genuine objects’; and so concedes that the kind of simplicity in 
question is not absolute or objective, but is rather a more flexible matter of ‘relative 
simplicity’ (Ramsey, 1931:127). Accepting that such delineation may be extremely 
difficult, Ramsey points out that what matters is that there is no impossibility to it 
and if it is merely possible for the ranges to be symmetrical, this means that the 
difference felt between the logical constructions ‘Socrates’ and ‘wise’ is not a 
logical one. Ramsey concludes that it is instead ‘of a subjective character and 
depend[ent] on human interests and needs’ (Ramsey, 1931:129).  
     As Ramsey stresses, arguing that it is possible for the ranges of generalisation to 
be symmetrical is entirely compatible with holding that they are nonetheless, in 
actuality, asymmetric. Ramsey’s point is that although it is true that predicates 
determine a wide and a narrow range of propositions while subjects determine only 
a wide range in connection with generalisation, this is not because of a logical 
impossibility on the subject’s part to determine a narrow range but is rather 
effected practically (Ramsey, 1931:125). Anything short of the asymmetry in range 
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being due to a difference in the intrinsic logical nature of subject and predicate will 
not do however if the felt difference is to be a defence of the particular-universal 
distinction.  
     Therefore, since the difference between the incomplete symbols is not a logical 
difference it cannot support a distinction between objects into particulars and 
universals. For, as we saw, it is a logical distinction between subject and predicate 
that Ramsey is searching for to ground the ontological distinction. In particular, the 
felt difference cannot support the view that predicates are intrinsically more 
incomplete than subjects. The difference between the range of subject and 
predicate, identified as the essence of the felt difference, was found to issue not 
from the intrinsic logical nature of subject and predicate but from unessential 
convention. Thus the felt difference between subject and predicate fails as a defence 
of the view that simple predicates are PLA-incomplete. 
 
The remaining force of the felt difference 
One avenue remains, however, for the argument. Although Ramsey’s investigation 
into the felt difference at the complex level concludes that it is not substantiated by 
any logical difference, this still leaves open whether the difference felt between 
subject and predicate at the complex level is actually a manifestation of some logical 
difference at the atomic level. In other words, although it is true that we could use 
ranges which were symmetrical, we use the ranges of generalisation that we do 
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because of some feature of atomic propositions that supports the view that simple 
predicates are PLA-incomplete. 
     Of course the mere fact that there is a distinction between elements of complex 
propositions does not on its own give us reason to assume some difference in the 
elements of atomic propositions. And so Ramsey next moves onto consider 
whether or not there is indeed any reason to think that the felt difference has a 
corresponding logical difference at the atomic level. 
 
2.2.4 The argument from convenience of symbolism 
Ramsey combines investigating whether the felt difference indicates a distinction in 
atomic propositions with his treatment of Russell’s second defence: that his 
symbolism is superior to its alternatives and that its convenience can only be 
explained by taking it to most accurately correspond to reality.  
     As we saw, in Russell’s symbolism subjects and predicates are differently 
represented. While the subject is depicted as standing alone the predicate is never 
depicted independently but is instead always represented as a ‘propositional 
function’ such as ‘x is p’ by the use of some variable x (Ramsey, 1931:129), even in 
the atomic case. If it is true that Russell’s symbolism, which represents predicates 
differently from subjects, is the most convenient, it certainly gives support to the 
idea that there is some essential difference between the objects they represent. 
Furthermore since the difference is one of independence this would be sufficiently 
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explained by the view that predicates are intrinsically more incomplete than 
subjects. 
     Since the role of this argument is to challenge the view that simple predicates are 
PLA-incomplete (B*), then it is particularly relevant is whether it is necessary to 
represent elements of atomic propositions by way of a propositional function. 
Furthermore, since in Russell’s symbolism predicates in atomic propositions are 
represented in the same way as predicates in complex propositions, this would 
support the idea that the felt difference between elements of propositions at the 
complex level corresponds to some kind of difference at the atomic level. 
      Ramsey expounds why representing predicates as propositional functions is so 
singularly essential. Regarding the property ‘either having R to a or having S to b’ 
he points out that we simply cannot represent this property by a simple symbol such 
as ‘ ’ standing alone. This is because we would not be able to define ‘ ’. 
Representing ‘ ’ as a propositional function ‘ x’ we can define it by ‘ x . = . xRa . 
v . xSb.’ (Ramsey, 1931:130). Without use of the variables, however, we would 
not possibly be able to indicate the argument places using only ‘ ’. Most 
importantly we would not be able to indicate whether the arguments were to be 
filled by the same objects or by different ones. We could only produce something 
like ‘  =  Ra . v . Sb’ (ibid). In other words, we would not be able to tell if ‘ ’ 
represented a property or if it represented a relation such as ‘x having R to a or y 
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having S to b’ for two variables x and y. Therefore Ramsey concedes that for this 
purpose Russell’s symbolism is ‘absolutely essential’ (ibid).  
     Ramsey continues his investigation, however, by qualifying that this point applies 
only to properties like ‘either having R to a or having S to b’. In other words, it only 
pertains to complex predicates. If we take the example of a two-termed atomic 
proposition ‘ a’ then it is clear that there is no need to indicate its argument places 
in the same way as before (Ramsey, 1931:130). The simple predicate ‘ ’ can stand 
alone without a variable just as much as ‘a’ can, since in the case of an atomic 
proposition there is just not the same ambiguity regarding the predicate. This will 
always be the case because there will only ever be such ambiguity if a predicate has 
multiple argument places and if a predicate has multiple argument places then it 
must, of course, be a complex predicate. A simple predicate with a single argument 
place such as ‘ ’ need not be represented as a propositional function ‘ x’, it is as 
unambiguous as a simple name. Therefore although simple predicates are standardly 
represented by way of propositional functions in Russell’s symbolism, it is not 
essential to them that they be represented in this way since the vital reason to do so 
holds only in the case of complex propositions. 
    Ramsey concludes: 
 
96 
 
…because some  ’s are incomplete and cannot stand alone, and all  ’s are to be treated 
alike in order to avoid useless complication, the only solution is to allow none to stand 
alone (Ramsey, 1931:131). 
 
This, of course, means that simple predicates are not represented by PLA-
incomplete propositional functions for any essential reason, but that this form of 
representation has led to them being mistakenly conceived of as PLA-incomplete. 
Therefore the argument from convenience of symbolism fails as a defence of the 
theory that simple predicates are PLA-incomplete. 
 
2.3 Conclusion to chapter two 
We saw that Ramsey’s essay aims to challenge the view that universals are PLA-
incomplete by establishing a diagnosis as to why universals have come to be 
conceived of in this way and targeting his arguments towards exposing the fault in 
these reasons. We identified the premises that Ramsey’s arguments aim to reject to 
be the claim that complex predicates are names (A*) and the claim that simple 
predicates are PLA-incomplete (B*).  
     We saw that the incomprehensible trinity argument and the argument from 
definition are intended to supplement each other in rejecting (A*) by reductio ad 
absurdum. The felt difference argument and the argument from definition are 
intended to work together to reject (B*). The latter arguments do so also in a more 
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indirect way; identifying the reasons that simple predicates have been conceived of 
as PLA-incomplete and exposing them as groundless or unnecessary. All of the four 
main arguments in Ramsey’s paper are carefully tailored to their purpose and 
depend upon the others for their success. Therefore it is clear that given the 
structure of Ramsey’s article we can only truly understand and assess the merits of 
each of these arguments if we take into account the diagnosis that he offers in his 
paper, the role of the surrounding arguments and the background context of the 
view that he aims to challenge. 
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Chapter Three 
 
This chapter will take up the incomprehensible trinity argument in more depth. It 
will explore the mechanisms of the argument by employing the distinction between 
analysis and decomposition and present Dummett’s criticism that the argument is 
based on an assumption that confuses features of the two. It will then consider the 
origin of this mistaken assumption arguing that Ramsey is in fact attributing it to his 
opponent. Finally it will consider whether Ramsey has any motivation for targeting 
his argument towards a view that adheres to such a faulty assumption and argue that 
he does only if he is granted certain atomistic assumptions that he shares with 
Russell. 
     Distinguishing between analysis and decomposition only exposes the 
incomprehensible trinity argument to rely on a confusion if we fail to take into 
account the wider context of Universals and the features of the surrounding 
arguments that make it clear that such a confusion is exactly what Ramsey aims to 
reject. Thus rather than providing an objection to the argument, analysis and 
decomposition provide a lens through which the conclusion of the incomprehensible 
trinity argument is made clearer.  
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3.1 Dummett and the incomprehensible trinity argument 
Dummett accuses Ramsey’s incomprehensible trinity argument of failing to 
distinguish between features of analysis and features of decomposition (Dummett, 
1981:264). This section will return to the attempt to comprehend the mechanisms 
of the incomprehensible trinity argument. It will show that employing Dummett’s 
distinction of analysis and decomposition seems to resolve the argument and in 
particular renders unproblematic the claim that the same proposition can be 
conceived of as having different parts, in this way expounding Dummett’s criticism. 
 
3.1.1 What is incomprehensible about the incomprehensible trinity 
argument? 
Let us once again take up the short but notorious incomprehensible trinity 
argument: 
 
In order to make things clearer let us take a simpler case, a proposition of the form aRb; 
then this theory will hold that there are three closely related propositions; one asserts that 
the relation R holds between the terms a and b, the second asserts the possession by a of 
the complex property of ‘having R to b’, while the third asserts that b has the complex 
property that a has R to it. These must be three different propositions because they have 
different sets of constituents, and yet they are not three propositions, but one proposition, 
for they all say the same thing, namely that a has R to b. So the theory of complex 
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universals is responsible for an incomprehensible trinity, as senseless as that of theology 
(Ramsey, 1931:118). 
 
Meeting the incomprehensible trinity argument in chapter two we saw that Ramsey 
explicitly considers it to function as a reductio ad absurdum (1931:199). As such it 
aims to demonstrate that the opposing view leads to absurd conclusions and hence 
should be rejected. We saw also that Ramsey identifies the opposing view to be the 
theory that complex predicates name complex universals (1931:118). 
 
The target of the argument 
Ramsey takes it that subject and predicate are not applicable to a compound 
proposition such as ‘Either Frege is wise or Russell is foolish’. Of course he 
concedes that we might pick out, for some purpose, a complex term such as ‘being 
wise unless Russell is foolish’. However, he denies that this complex term is 
functioning as a predicate in the compound proposition in the way that ‘is wise’ and 
‘is foolish’ are functioning as predicates in the two disjuncts ‘Frege is wise’ and 
‘Russell is foolish’. He then anticipates that some interlocutor might protest that the 
complex terms that can be identified in complex propositions are indeed 
functioning as predicates, and it is towards the end of denying the coherence of this 
view that the incomprehensible trinity argument is introduced. 
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This denial is significant if we remind ourselves that Ramsey is searching for a 
difference in the functioning of elements in a proposition that would support a 
theory of universals, that is, for a logical distinction between subject and predicate 
that could provide a basis for a distinction between objects into particulars and 
universals. As Ramsey stresses in the passage leading into the incomprehensible 
trinity argument; although he asks which propositions have subjects and predicates 
his concern remains with reality.  
 
…let us remind ourselves that the task on which we are engaged is not merely one of 
English grammar; we are not school children analysing sentences into subject, extension of 
the subject, complement and so on, but are interested not so much in sentences 
themselves, as in what they mean, from which we hope to discover the logical nature of 
reality (Ramsey, 1913:117). 
 
Thus his concern with language is only in so far as language is taken to be a vehicle 
for accessing reality. 
     To apply this point to the specifics of the argument: whether or not we may call 
something a predicate is only relevant to Ramsey if calling it a predicate means 
identifying something in reality (that we might call a universal). Hence we see more 
clearly that Ramsey means to oppose a view that has not just a linguistic contention 
about predicates but an ontological one. The claim that complex predicates can be 
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discerned from complex propositions is only of concern to Ramsey if by this his 
interlocutor means that the complex predicate is taken to stand for a universal 
which must be complex, corresponding to the complexity of that which denotes it.  
     The view anticipated by Ramsey that complex predicates denote complex 
universals will henceforth be referred to as CU. 
 
Review 
Chapter two identified the two assumptions which Ramsey claims CU is committed 
to and that generate the argument as a reductio ad absurdum. These regard the three 
‘closely related’ propositions in the argument and were presented as the unity and 
trinity contention: 
(Unity Premise): the propositions are the same because they ‘say the same 
thing’. 
(Trinity Contention): the propositions are three different propositions 
because they ‘have different sets of constituents’. 
For the argument to go through we also articulated three assumptions that must be 
made: 
 That the unity premise and the trinity contention are sufficiently 
contradictory. 
 That CU is committed to the unity premise. 
 That CU is committed to the trinity contention. 
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We were satisfied that the premises where contradictory. We then conceded that 
CU was committed to the unity premise in as far as everyone should be. It’s 
important, however, that we articulate why the unity premise is taken to be 
uncontroversial.  
 
The comprehensible unity premise  
Though the unity premise is the most intuitive it is, perhaps, not as obvious why it 
is so singularly essential that we maintain ‘(a)R(b)’, ‘(a)Rb’ and ‘aR(b)’ are all the 
very same proposition and not merely three closely related ones. Of course there is 
a sense in which we may deny that these propositions are identical: given an 
extremely fine grained conception of a proposition. What Ramsey intends to 
capture in the unity premise, however, is that although the three propositions are 
not expressed by the same sentence, they have the same meaning. That is to say, the 
three sentences all ‘say the same thing’ (1931:118).   
     Ramsey tells us that splitting up a proposition in the way described by the 
argument occurs in connection with generalisation (Ramsey, 1931:123). Consider 
the simple example of putting a chain of inferences together to constitute a proof, 
something of the form        . To make apparent the relevance of the example 
let’s use the incomprehensible trinity argument itself:                          . 
This says that everything R’s b, which implies that a R’s b, which implies that a R’s 
104 
 
something. This is a valid proof which means both sides of the proof are valid 
inferences.  
     To see why the proof is valid we must consider the middle proposition. In the 
proposition ‘aRb’ we can identify (at least) two ways of splitting it up. We can treat 
either the a or the b as subject so as to give either (a)Rb or aR(b). Since         and 
(a)Rb both treat the same argument place as variable we are able to see the validity 
of the first inference and similarly since        and aR(b) have their form in 
common exposes the validity of the second inference. Hence it is essential to 
explaining the validity of the proof that the middle proposition admits of these two 
distinct representations. The most essential point is that although we can identify 
these different ways of splitting up the proposition this fact must not lead us to 
conclude that in ‘aRb’ there are two different propositions. For if (a)Rb and aR(b) 
were in every sense distinct propositions, if they did not have the same meaning, 
then we could not conceive of the proof as being validated by a single link that 
connects the first inference with the second inference by having something in 
common with both of them. It must be the same thing that is split up in one way to 
be the conclusion of one inference and split up in another way to be the premise of 
the other. 
     In short, the validity of the first inference depends on us being able to 
decompose aRb into (a)Rb, the validity of the second inference depends on us being 
able to decompose aRb into aR(b) and the validity of the proof depends on us being 
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able to recognise (a)Rb and aR(b) as a single proposition. In this way the validity of 
the proof depends upon the unity premise. Therefore the unity premise, the idea 
that we can split up a single proposition in different ways is essential to the role of a 
proposition in logic. The proposition that is the conclusion to the first step of the 
proof must be the very same thing as the proposition that is a premise of the second 
step of the proof. This is why Geach said: 
 
Logic would be hopelessly crippled if the same proposition could never be analysed in 
several different ways (Geach, 1962:55). 
 
     Since the unity premise is set up as undisputable for this reason, it follows that 
CU is committed to it and thus that the reductio is weighted towards the rejection of 
the trinity contention. That is to say, the argument is structured as a reductio by first 
identifying CU’s commitment to the trinity contention and then bringing the trinity 
contention into conflict with the uncontestable unity premise, causing the trinity 
contention and thus CU to be rejected as absurd.  
     From this we can see that the key move, vital to the success of the argument as a 
reductio, is establishing CU’s commitment to the trinity contention (3). Once this is 
in place CU’s uncontroversial commitment to the unity premise and the obviously 
contradictory claims in the unity and trinity contention do the rest of the work to 
output the result that the view is absurd. However, this pivotal point is the most 
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contentious of the argument and most criticism of the incomprehensible trinity 
argument has fastened upon it. 
 
The incomprehensible trinity contention 
Ramsey starts with the observation that given a single proposition we can identify 
different complex terms, different ways of splitting it up. He couples this with the 
fact that the proponent of CU will consider some of these complex terms to be 
predicates so that from one proposition we can discern various complex predicates. 
From Ramsey’s own example ‘aRb’ the proponent of CU will hold that we can 
identify three predicates: ‘xRy’, ‘xRb’ and ‘aRx’ (1931:118). Further to this CU will 
hold that these three complex predicates stand for three complex universals, three 
different properties. 
     So far there is not much to dispute given Ramsey’s example and the 
characterisation of his opponent. But Ramsey further concludes that the proponent 
of CU is committed to saying that there are three distinct propositions in ‘aRb’ for 
the reason that there are three complex predicates (and corresponding subjects). In 
other words CU is committed to the trinity contention: the claim that there are 
three different propositions because there are three different sets of constituents.   
     The trinity contention is named as such because unlike the unity premise it is a 
mini-argument. As such it contains a premise within it rather than being a premise 
itself. When the contention ‘there are three different propositions because there are 
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three different sets of constituents’ is broken down it yields the premise that there 
are three sets of constituents, the inference that the different sets of constituents 
imply different propositions, and the conclusion that there are three propositions. 
Thus the argument has the following structure: 
(Trinity Inference): different sets of constituents imply different 
propositions. 
(Trinity Premise): there are three different sets of constituents. 
(Trinity Conclusion): there are three different propositions.  
Taken together these three premises compose what we called the trinity 
contention:  
(Trinity Contention): there are three different propositions because there 
are three different sets of constituents. 
     With this new terminology we can say more clearly that the most problematic 
part of the trinity contention is the trinity inference. For, while Ramsey rightly 
attributes CU with the trinity premise (the claim that there are three different sets 
of constituents), he also attributes CU with commitment to the trinity inference 
and hence to the trinity conclusion. The claim made by the trinity inference, 
however, that distinct parts entail distinct propositions is not a straightforward one 
and is certainly not uncontentious. Most significantly, it is a claim about the 
uniqueness of the combination of elements in a proposition. While this is of course 
a respectable position, it seems far too presumptuous of Ramsey to saddle the 
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proponent of CU with a view about the structure of propositions and the 
uniqueness of sub-propositional parts on the basis of a view regarding complex 
predicates. It seems clear, on the surface at least, that one could hold the view that 
complex predicates discerned from propositions denote complex universals while 
remaining agnostic as to how those propositions are themselves structured and in 
particular whether their parts were unique. That is to say, it seems clear that one 
could maintain CU while denying the trinity inference. 
     In order to proceed, therefore, we must consider the trinity contention in more 
depth, in particular exploring the claim in the trinity inference that propositions are 
distinguished by their parts. We must also consider whether Ramsey’s opponent is 
committed to the trinity contention. Both of these objectives will be satisfied by 
evaluating the argument in the light of Dummett’s distinction between analysis and 
decomposition.  
 
3.1.2 Analysis and decomposition 
Not only will expounding the distinction between analysis and decomposition 
enable us to assess the puzzling trinity contention, but with the distinction in place 
we will be able to present Dummett’s insightful criticism of Ramsey. As we shall 
see, Dummett’s distinction is a powerful tool that provides us with an invaluable 
means to understanding the mechanisms of the incomprehensible trinity argument. 
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Explaining analysis and decomposition 
Dummett introduces analysis and decomposition to resolve a tension in Frege 
regarding the composition of propositions. On the one hand Frege clearly took the 
meaning (or ‘sense’) of a proposition to be dependent on the sense of its parts 
(Frege, 1969:243, 1976:225, 1989:§32). On the other hand Frege is also explicit 
that propositions are not built up from their constituent concepts, and that we can 
identify different concepts in a proposition by analysing it in different ways (Frege, 
1969:273, 1979:253). 
     In order to resolve this seemingly contradictory position Dummett characterises 
two very different kinds of analysis. He reserves the term ‘analysis’ for the first of 
these, so that analysis is taken to be the investigation into a proposition’s intrinsic 
structure. For Dummett, the purpose of analysis is to reveal how the meaning of a 
proposition depends on the meaning of the parts.8 
 
Analysis… is concerned with how the sense of the sentence is given to us, that is, with 
what it is to understand that sentence as expressing the thought that it does (Dummett, 
1981:287). 
 
Analysis typically takes place in several stages and traces the ‘constructional history’ 
of the proposition, revealing what Dummett calls its constituents (Dummett, 
                                                          
8
 Here and elsewhere I am innocently conflating ‘meaning’ and Fregean ‘sense’ in order that we are not 
pulled too deeply into Frege’s terminology and to highlight the points of intersection with our current 
concerns. Likewise with ‘thought’ and ‘proposition’. 
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1981:271, 283). The parts of a given proposition may themselves have parts which 
will be traced back in the analysis so that its ultimate constituents will all be simple. 
Understanding of a proposition’s constituents is always prior to the understanding 
of the proposition. In other words, the constituents are what we need to have 
grasped in order to grasp the proposition. Importantly, the constituents of a 
proposition will be unique. Dummett likens the process of analysis to the process of 
investigating a molecule’s atomic structure (Dummett, 1981:263,272). A molecule 
is built up out of atoms in the same way that a proposition is built up from its 
constituents. The atoms that make up a molecule are similarly simple and unique 
and a matter of the molecule’s intrinsic structure. 
      From this kind of analysis Dummett distinguishes ‘decomposition’; the process 
by which expressions are removed from a proposition and replaced by variables to 
form an incomplete expression (Dummett, 1981:273). For Dummett, the purposes 
of decomposition are twofold. Firstly, it aims to explain the validity of an inference 
or exhibit such an inference as displaying a general pattern. Decomposition allows 
us to do this by providing us with the means to extract from premise and conclusion 
some common expression. As we saw the validity of the proof 
                        , relies on us being able to recognise the function shared 
by     and aRb and the function shared by aRb and aRy. Since aRb can be 
decomposed to give (a)Rb or aR(b) this demonstrates that aRb can be conceived of as 
having a function in common with the premise of the first inference and with the 
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conclusion of the second. Decomposing it in this way thus exposes exactly what 
features of the proposition we exploit in order to move from premise to conclusion 
while preserving the validity of the proof.  
     Secondly, decomposition is part of the formation of sentences. Decomposition 
takes place in a single step and reveals, not the constituents of a proposition, but 
what Dummett calls its components (Dummett, 1981:275). Since these components 
are involved in the formation of new terms it’s clear that in general we do not need 
to grasp the components of a proposition in order to grasp the proposition. 
Components of a proposition can be simple or complex; they are more aptly 
described as patterns that can be discerned in propositions rather than parts. For this 
reason the different sets of components that can be found in propositions are 
certainly not unique and are compatible with each other. Dummett likens the 
process of decomposition to the process of dividing up a country into regions 
(Dummett, 1981:263,275). There is no unique way of identifying such regions and 
such a division is not part of the internal structure of the country. 
 
Analysis and decomposition as interconnected 
Importantly, analysis and decomposition are compatible with each other; they are 
merely two different kinds of analysis, two different models of the relation of a 
whole to its parts. One is concerned with the dependence of a proposition on its 
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internal structure and the other is concerned with a proposition’s inferential 
relations to other propositions. Dummett is careful to stress their compatibility. 
 
No inconsistency is involved in saying that the sentence, or the thought expressed, must 
be regarded as having been formed out of its constituents in one unique way, but that, 
once it is formed, it is possible to see it as exemplifying each of several different patterns 
(Dummett, 1981:280). 
 
Dummett also brings out here that far from analysis and decomposition being 
inconsistent with each other, the two directions of enquiry are intricately 
interconnected. In particular he notes how decomposition presupposes analysis, so 
that the different decompositions that are available will depend on the constituent 
structure of the proposition.  
     To see that this is the case consider Ramsey’s own example ‘Either Socrates is 
wise or Plato is foolish’. Ramsey identifies ‘x is wise unless Plato is foolish’ as a 
legitimate decomposition of this proposition. Although by decomposition we may 
expose different patterns in a proposition in this way, it is not the case that we can 
conceive of just any part of the proposition as replaceable by a variable to form an 
expression. If this were the case then we should be able to decompose the 
proposition ‘Either Socrates is wise or Plato is foolish’ to give ‘Either So-x is wise or 
Plato is foolish’ and then, exploiting the intersubstitutability of the words ‘crates’ 
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and ‘boxes’, use the decomposed function to conclude nonsensically ‘Either 
Soboxes is wise or Plato is foolish’. 
      But why is it that we cannot conceive of the word ‘crates’ as it occurs in 
‘Socrates’ as a pattern that we might extract when we can straightforwardly do so 
for propositions such as ‘The crates were heavy’? The reason is that the legitimate 
patterns that we can identify in a proposition - the elements that we can conceive of 
as going variable - are determined by a proposition’s constituent structure. In 
Ramsey’s example ‘Socrates’ is a constituent, a name, and so forms an individuated 
part of the proposition in the same way as ‘crates’ in ‘The crates were heavy’. As a 
result both words are only replaceable in their entirety by other words in the range 
of the function that takes them as argument. Therefore the decompositions that we 
are able to identify in a proposition are dependent upon, and in this way 
presuppose, the intrinsic structure of a proposition, as uncovered by analysis. 
     As Dummett acknowledges, this reliance is not one-sided. Analysis depends on 
decomposition too. 
 
Although analysis and decomposition are distinct processes, they are… intimately linked. 
The analysis of a quantified sentence requires us to see a predicate, in a general complex, 
as a constituent of it, and the conception of the complex predicate is attained by 
decomposition of a simpler sentence (Dummett, 1981:276). 
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Analysis presupposes a grasp of the proposition’s constituents which we obtain via 
the decomposition of other propositions. To see why this doesn’t become circular 
recall that although grasping a proposition’s constituents is required to grasp the 
proposition, this is not the case with the proposition’s components. Therefore we can 
say without circularity that we grasp some basic concepts and thus some basic 
propositions, and from them extract some new concepts by decomposition, which 
become the constituents of other propositions. This is only feasible if we recognise 
that: 
 
The components arrived at by [decompositions] are not, in general, genuine constituents 
of it, and our understanding of the sentence is therefore independent of our recognition of 
the complex predicate as occurring in it (Dummett, 1981:278). 
 
Analysis and decomposition then, while being two distinct directions of enquiry, 
nonetheless exist in this perpetual state of interdependent presupposition to each 
other. In particular, decomposition presupposes analysis in that the components 
that can be identified in a proposition depend on its constituent structure. Analysis 
on the other hand requires us to already have grasped some concepts by way of 
decomposition, and so the components of simpler sentences become the 
constituents of more complicated ones. 
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Analysis and decomposition in Frege 
Having established this lemma Dummett returns to Frege. He argues that it is 
entirely consistent for Frege to hold that a proposition has a unique structure and 
that the meaning of the proposition is dependent on the meaning of its parts, while 
also maintaining that the proposition can be analysed in distinct ways and that there 
are concepts that are not parts of the proposition but are arrived at subsequent to 
our grasp of the proposition.  
     Simply, the first of these theses relates to the analysis of a proposition, where it 
is the case that the constituents are unique and must be grasped prior to grasping the 
proposition. The second thesis relates to decomposition where the components of a 
proposition are generally grasped subsequent to the grasp of the proposition itself 
and the proposition can admit of many different patterns in this way. As we saw, 
analysis and decomposition are not only compatible but the two processes cannot be 
understood except as distinct but closely interdependent directions of enquiry. In 
this way Dummett resolves the apparent tension in Frege’s view of the structure of 
propositions (Dummett, 1981:261-291). 
 
3.1.3 Interpreting the incomprehensible trinity argument using analysis 
and decomposition 
Let us now turn back to Ramsey and the incomprehensible trinity argument. 
Analysis and decomposition, as we have seen, articulate two distinct but connected 
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directions of enquiry into the parts of a proposition. One is concerned with the 
parts that go into making the proposition and one with parts that can be identified in 
a proposition, once it is so constructed. This brings us back to the claim that 
propositions are distinguished by their parts, made by the trinity inference, since we 
are now in a position to ask: what kind of parts does Ramsey have in mind, 
constituent parts or component parts? Once we have established this we may then 
consider whether the proponent of CU need be committed to the same 
interpretation of ‘parts’. But for now let’s consider the trinity inference in light of 
two distinct interpretations of the trinity contention. 
     Let us first interpret the trinity contention in terms of analysis. This will yield: 
(Trinity Inference A): different sets of constituents imply different 
propositions. 
(Trinity Premise A): there are three different sets of constituents. 
(Trinity Conclusion): there are three different propositions.  
 
(Trinity Contention A): there are three different propositions because there 
are three different sets of constituents. 
 
      The trinity inference (A) makes the claim that three sets of constituents imply 
three propositions. When we are using the Dummetian notion of a constituent in 
connection with analysis, this will certainly be true. As we saw, the constituents of 
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a proposition are simple and they are unique. This means that propositions will be 
distinguished by their constituents and in particular distinct sets of constituents will 
imply distinct propositions. Thus interpreting the trinity contention in terms of 
analysis gives us an understanding of the claim made in the trinity inference that is 
legitimate.  
      Interpreting the trinity contention in terms of decomposition will give: 
(Trinity Inference D): different sets of components imply different 
propositions. 
(Trinity Premise D): there are three different sets of components. 
(Trinity Conclusion): there are three different propositions.  
 
(Trinity Contention D): there are three different propositions because there 
are three different sets of components. 
 
The trinity inference (D) makes the claim that three sets of components imply three 
propositions. But on a Dummetian understanding of component in connection with 
decomposition, this just isn’t the case. For a proposition to have different sets of 
components, or rather, for us to be able to identify different component structures 
in a proposition, does not entail that there are multiple propositions. The 
decompositions of a proposition aren’t unique in this way. Drawing out patterns in 
a proposition may be dependent upon, and thus in some sense constricted by, the 
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constituent structure of the proposition, as we saw earlier. But this is not to say that 
finding one pattern in a proposition excludes us from being able to find another.  
     Furthermore it is vital that we are able to recognise that there are distinct 
patterns that can be identified in a single proposition. After all, as Dummett has 
pointed out, one of the central functions of decomposition is to exhibit the validity 
of inferences. If the components of a proposition were unique in the same way as its 
constituents then we would not be able to recognise a single proposition as 
featuring as a shared premise in a valid argument. This is because if we drew out 
two different patterns from a proposition then we would have to say that these 
were patterns in two propositions, rather than saying that they were two 
decompositions - two components - of the same proposition. However, if a single 
premise could not admit of different decompositions this would endanger the 
validity of copious arguments including the previous example 
                         which employs ‘aRb’ as the middle link in a chain of 
proof. Therefore distinct sets of components cannot be said to imply distinct 
propositions.  
     Therefore, interoperating the trinity contention in terms of analysis yields an 
understanding of the trinity inference it on which it is valid. Interoperating the 
trinity contention in terms of decomposition, on the other hand, shows the trinity 
inference to be mistaken, and furthermore, that it is mistaken is essential to the very 
function of decomposition. 
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3.1.4 Dummett’s objection 
With this in place we may return to asking what interpretation of parts Ramsey 
means to employ in the trinity contention and whether the proponent of CU is 
committed to this same interpretation. 
 
Constituents or components? 
On the one hand it seems that Ramsey must mean constituent parts, given that we 
found the only sound interpretation of the trinity inference to be 
(Trinity Inference A): different sets of constituents imply different 
propositions. 
On this view, the three propositions are different because they have different 
ultimate parts, that is, different simple, unique constituents. 
     However, recall that Ramsey deduces the trinity contention from the theory of 
CU. He says that CU will take there to be three ‘related’ propositions: one 
including the predicate ‘xRy’, one including the complex predicate ‘xRb’, and a third 
including the complex predicate ‘aRx’ (Ramsey, 1931:118). Though it seems fair to 
draw out from CU the view that these different predicates can be discerned from a 
single proposition, it seems, at best, a stretch to further attribute CU with the view 
that these predicates are all constituents of the proposition. 
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Recall Ramsey characterises CU as the position that in compound propositions we 
can discern complex propositions that denote universals. CU, therefore, is a theory 
concerning the complex parts of a proposition. Given this, it seems that the 
proponent of CU could remain completely agnostic regarding the simple predicates 
that could be discerned from a proposition. In other words, given that the 
proponent of CU takes there to be different complex terms that can be identified in 
the proposition, what reason could he have for accepting that these terms were 
constituents of the proposition, and thus that they were unique and even simple?  
     However, the assumption that ‘xRy’ ,‘xRb’ and ‘aRx’ are all constituents of ‘aRb’ 
is essential to establishing trinity premise (A). Therefore, if Ramsey does intend the 
subject of the trinity inference to be a proposition’s constituents it looks as though he 
is simply mistaken in conceiving of the complex predicates recognised by CU as 
constituents of the propositions they can be discerned from. 
     If Ramsey means component parts to be the subject of the trinity premise then 
we get 
(Trinity Inference B): different sets of components imply different 
propositions. 
      It was this interpretation, however, that we found to be problematic. In 
particular it doesn’t follow from the fact that there are distinct components that 
there are distinct propositions. Furthermore we saw that this was no trivial point; 
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for if propositions were distinguished by their distinct components, it would be 
disastrous to the central purpose of decomposition. 
     It seems, therefore, that applying the distinction between analysis and 
decomposition to the trinity inference puts Ramsey between a rock and a hard 
place. For it looks like we must either accuse Ramsey of mistaking a feature of 
analysis or mistaking a feature of decomposition. In particular: his argument either 
wrongly assumes that complex predicates are among a proposition’s constituents or 
wrongly assumes that the component structure of a proposition is unique, in the 
way that its constituent structure is. Let us now consider how this impasse 
regarding the trinity inference impacts upon the incomprehensible trinity argument 
as a whole.  
 
Trinity (A) and the incomprehensible trinity argument 
Ramsey seems vulnerable to the accusation that he wrongly conceives of complex 
predicates as constituents if we take him to have intended trinity contention (A). 
Furthermore it looks as though there is nothing in the theory characterised as CU 
that commits Ramsey’s opponent to trinity premise (A). It seems that the 
proponent of CU, in so far as he accepts Dummett’s story about analysis, will agree 
that different constituent parts imply different propositions, and as such will agree 
to trinity inference (A). However, CU has no reason to hold that complex 
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predicates discerned from a proposition are constituents of that proposition and 
therefore seems unlikely to accept trinity premise (A). 
       This is especially damaging because Ramsey needs CU to be committed to the 
trinity contention for his argument to be successful as a reductio. For if CU is not 
shown by Ramsey to be committed to the trinity conclusion (that there are three 
propositions) then Ramsey has nothing to bring into tension with the unity premise 
(that there is one proposition) in order to expose CU as absurd. And even if CU is 
committed to trinity inference (A), unless CU is also committed to trinity premise 
(A) then CU need not be committed to the trinity conclusion that there are three 
propositions. Therefore, if we are not able to establish CU’s commitment to the 
trinity premise (A) then the reductio will not be successfully generated against CU. 
 
Trinity (D) and the incomprehensible trinity argument 
We found that on a Dummetian understanding of component, trinity inference (D) 
is internally incoherent. That is to say that interpreting the trinity inference as 
concerning component parts is problematic since three sets of components do not 
imply three propositions. A central feature of decomposition is that the components 
recognised in a proposition are not unique in that they do not individuate 
propositions. This feature we saw was essential to the very function of 
decomposition, in particular to recognising a single proposition as a shared premise 
in a valid proof.  
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The proponent of CU will have no problem counting the predicates Ramsey 
identifies as three different components of the proposition since the components of a 
proposition can be complex, and so will accept trinity premise (D). As we saw, 
however, when we articulate the features of decomposition it undermines trinity 
inference (D). This is problematic because when the trinity inference (D) is 
undermined in this way CU is no longer committed to the trinity conclusion and as 
such no longer makes a claim that is in conflict with the unity premise. Simply, one 
proposition can admit of multiple decompositions, multiple patterns. Thus the 
unity premise and the trinity contention become compatible through the lenses of 
decomposition and the argument only masquerades as a reductio. 
     What both interpretations of the trinity contention respectively bring to light is 
that for the incomprehensible trinity argument to be successful Ramsey has to either 
attribute to CU the view that complex predicates are constituents, or the view that 
a proposition’s components are unique in the way that its constituents are. Both of 
these theses we found to be contestable in themselves: on a Dummetian understand 
of analysis and decomposition, both are simply mistakes. And there seems to be no 
reason for Ramsey’s opponent to be committed to either dubious view. 
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Dummett’s criticism  
Dummett (1981) clearly takes it that the distinction between analysis and 
decomposition has some bearing on the issues brought out in Ramsey’s paper. 
Indeed, it is in the chapter Alternative Analyses, where Dummett explains analysis and 
decomposition in greatest depth, that he introduces the criticism against the 
incomprehensible trinity argument9.  
     In short, Dummett accuses Ramsey of failing to recognise that a single 
proposition can be analysed in different ways. Dummett takes the incomprehensible 
trinity argument to be fuelled by Ramsey’s struggle to answer the question, ‘How 
can there be distinct possible analyses of the same proposition?’ (Dummett, 
1981:264). Dummett’s answer to this is: by the process of decomposition. For 
Dummett, the supposed conflict between the unity premise and the trinity 
contention is resolved by articulating and separating features of analysis and features 
of decomposition.  
 
[Ramsey’s] difficulty ought to dissolve as soon as it is realised that the analysis of a 
proposition is not like the analysis of a molecule, but like the analysis of a country into 
regions (Dummett, 1981:264). 
 
                                                          
9
 Dummett takes his criticism to be in line with Geach’s objection to the same argument (Dummett, 
1981:264-266). 
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With such a realisation in place we can say that while ‘aRb’ admits of one unique 
analysis, it admits of three complimentary decompositions. And given the 
interdependence of analysis and decomposition there is no contradiction left for 
Ramsey to exploit against CU.  
     In this sense, Dummett takes no stand on whether Ramsey should be interpreted 
as forwarding trinity contention (A) or trinity contention (D). He is not concerned 
with asking whether Ramsey intended the trinity contention to involve constituents 
or components because he takes Ramsey to have been confused between the two. In 
particular, Ramsey has taken a proposition’s components to be simple and unique and 
as such to distinguish the propositions they are a part of when simplicity and 
uniqueness are features only of a proposition’s constituent parts. In this way Ramsey 
has mixed up features of analysis with features of decomposition and in his bid to 
see through the muddle of universals is responsible for a muddle of his own. 
     It seems then that interpreting the incomprehensible trinity argument in terms of 
analysis and decomposition dissolves the argument as a reductio. It resolves the 
tension between the trinity and the unity premise by separating out the features of 
the two different directions of enquiry and exposing Ramsey as having failed to do 
the same. The argument only seems incomprehensible, therefore, because it works 
on the basis of this mistake. 
 
 
126 
 
3.2 Is Ramsey mistaken? 
This section will continue on from the identification of the mistaken assumption 
that underlies Ramsey’s reductio and explore the root of this mistake. It will first 
show that it is, at the very least, not obvious that the mistake being made is 
Ramsey’s. It will then explore different features of Ramsey’s argument to consider 
how likely it is that Ramsey is guilty of such a damaging and fundamental confusion. 
 
3.2.1 The parts-confused view 
Thanks to Dummett’s diagnosis we have got to the heart of the incomprehensible 
trinity problem and have been able to express exactly why it seems so puzzling. At 
its heart, we found there to be a confusion. Ramsey takes a proposition’s 
components to be simple and unique and as such to distinguish the propositions they 
are a part of when simplicity and uniqueness are features only of a proposition’s 
constituents. In treating a proposition’s components like its constituents Ramsey 
has mixed up features of decomposition with features of analysis. As we saw in 
detail, the argument only successfully functions as a reductio if is it able to exploit 
this confused notion of a proposition’s parts. 
     We may also express the confusion in non-Dummetian terms. The complex 
predicates that can be discerned in a proposition are being treated by Ramsey as if 
they were simple predicates. In particular, the complex predicates are being taken 
to individuate the propositions they are a part of as if they were the simple parts of 
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those propositions. Coupling this confusion of treating complex predicates as simple 
constituent parts of a proposition with CU’s theory that complex predicates name 
complex universals Ramsey then attributes to CU the view that a complex predicate 
names a universal in the same way that a simple predicate names a universal. In 
other words, instead of taking the complex predicate to be a complex name that 
denotes a complex universal Ramsey treats the complex predicate as a simple 
designation of its object - the complex universal. 
     For the sake of brevity the specifics of this mistaken view will, henceforth, 
occasionally be referred to as ‘the parts-confused view’. 
     From this angle there is no point in considering whether the proponent of CU 
would accept the parts-confused view: of course he would not; once separated out 
its patently confused. However, we must be careful in formulating our conclusion 
as to where this leaves Ramsey. For we would be too hasty to conclude with 
Dummett that merely articulating the distinction between analysis and 
decomposition will ‘dissolve’ Ramsey’s worry to the extent that it invalidates his 
entire argument. All we have established so far is that the argument cannot function 
without exploiting a conception of sub-propositional parts that we found to be 
confused between two directions of analysis. Having identified such a conception as 
a mistake we must at least ask, and not simply assume, whether the mistake is 
Ramsey’s own. 
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For, as we will see, other features of the incomprehensible trinity argument provide 
strong reasons to suggest that Ramsey is at least conscious of the parts-confused 
view, in which case we can rule out that it was an error in his own thinking. Such 
considerations suggest the possibility that Ramsey is both consciously and 
deliberately attributing the parts-confused view to his opponent. This in turn opens 
up the search for some reason why Ramsey should attribute to the view he opposes 
erroneous assumptions that conflate features of decomposition with features of 
analysis. 
 
3.2.2 Ramsey is not parts-confused 
This section will make two arguments to establish that the confusion that has been 
identified between components and constituents in the incomprehensible trinity 
argument cannot be easily attributed to Ramsey. It will do so by considering two 
features of Ramsey’s argument: first, the very structure of the reductio, and 
secondly, the assumptions that are exploited in the unity premise and the argument 
from definition.  
 
The structure of reductio 
As we saw before, the reductio is structured so that it is that it is weighted towards 
the rejection of the trinity contention. In other words the unity premise, for reasons 
that we detailed, is set up to be both intuitive and undeniable and as such CU is 
committed to it (in so far as any theory should be). Ramsey first establishes CU’s 
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commitment to the trinity contention and then brings this into conflict with the 
unity premise, making as they do contradictory claims regarding the number of 
propositions in question. 
     Given that the argument is set up to reject the trinity contention in this way, it is 
significant that the view that a proposition’s complex predicates are its constituents, 
the parts-confused view, is required in order to establish CU’s commitment to the 
trinity contention. We can infer from this that the structure of the reductio is in fact 
set up to anticipate the rejection of the contested mistaken view. Rather than failing 
to recognise such an important assumption that functions at such a pivotal point in 
the reductio, it is more plausible to suppose that Ramsey intends to oust the mistaken 
view along with complex universals. That is to say, Ramsey is taking the parts-
confused view to be part of the theory that he’s opposing. From this angle we can 
see Ramsey not only as avoiding the blame for simply being confused but as 
agreeing with Dummett that the conception of a proposition’s parts implicit in the 
opposing view is indeed mistaken and is to be rejected.  
 
The unity premise and argument from definition 
Let’s first spell out more fully the accusation that Ramsey is simply making a 
mistake and confusing features of analysis with features of decomposition. As we 
have seen, the accusation is more specifically that he is failing to recognise that the 
component structure of a proposition is not unique in the way that its constituent 
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structure is. We also found that the fact a proposition’s components are not unique 
is not a mere feature of decomposition but is rather an extremely important 
characteristic, without which decomposition could not fulfil one of its primary 
roles. For if components individuated propositions in the way that constituents do, 
that is to say, if trinity inference (D) held, then we would be unable to recognise 
that a single premise could be shared in a valid argument and as such we would be 
unable to explain or exhibit the validity of such a proof. Therefore, if we accuse 
Ramsey of making a mistake in this way, we accuse him of neglecting to realise that 
it is essential to recognising the validity of arguments involving a shared premise 
that the component structure of a proposition is not unique. 
     Recall, however, the motivation for the unity premise that legitimates Ramsey in 
assuming it to be intuitive, incontestable, and robust enough to shatter the trinity 
contention when they are brought into conflict by the reductio. We found that 
‘(a)R(b)’, ‘(a)Rb’ and ‘aR(b)’ have to be recognised as the same proposition if we are 
to be able to explain the validity of inferences involving a shared premise. We 
considered the valid proof                         . In order to recognise the 
validity of this proof we had to conceive of aRb as admitting of two distinct 
functions, (a)Rb and aR(b) so that it had a function in common with both the 
premise of the first inference and the conclusion of the second inference and in this 
way could act as a link between them. It was essential to this story however, that 
recognising the distinct functions in ‘aRb’ did not entail that it was two proposition, 
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for unless it is recognised as a single proposition it cannot act as such a link and we 
would be unable to account for the validity of the proof. For this reason it is odd to 
accuse Ramsey of making such a mistake as neglecting to realise that the component 
structure of a proposition is not unique and as such being unable to explain the 
validity of certain arguments. For, this is the very feature that Ramsey exploits 
elsewhere in the argument in establishing the unity premise.  
     To further evidence the fact that Ramsey is aware that component structure is 
not unique and indeed that he exploits this feature elsewhere in his paper, recall the 
argument from definition. We noted there that the first horn of the dilemma is 
intended to strengthen the unity premise by articulating a context in which the 
unity premise is more obviously essential, that of the process of definition. Since by 
the process of definition two propositions with different parts can nevertheless be 
attributed with the same meaning it must be that propositions with different 
structures can still be recognised to be the same proposition. Therefore, 
maintaining the unity premise in any given case is essential to the process of 
definition, and one of the purposes of the argument from definition is to exploit the 
non-uniqueness of a proposition’s components in this way. 
     Therefore although it is not outwith the bounds of possibility that Ramsey has 
made such a mistake it is nonetheless absurd to accuse Ramsey of failing to 
recognise a feature of decomposition when he set up the trinity contention since the 
very same feature underlies the unity premise and is emphasised by him in the 
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argument from definition which supplements the incomprehensible trinity 
argument. 
 
Who is parts-confused? 
These considerations of two different features of the incomprehensible trinity 
argument therefore show that we gravely underestimate Ramsey if we take him to 
be making a mistake in the argument in a straightforward way: in particular, by 
simply failing to appreciate that a proposition’s components are not unique in the 
way that its constituents are.  
     Rather than making this mistake himself it must be that Ramsey means to 
attribute the mistake to his opponent. In this sense the confusion between features 
of components and features of constituents is part of the muddle that Ramsey sets 
out to deny. If this is the case then the reductio does not fail because Ramsey 
confuses two notions but, rather, the very articulation of the parts-confused view 
merely brings out what Ramsey himself takes to be an error in his opponent’s 
theory. The reductio is of course perfectly entitled to exploit any such error if it is 
part of the opposing position. Thus, instead of concluding that the argument 
dissolves we should rather conclude, merely, that since the parts-confused view is 
essential to establishing that Ramsey’s opponent is committed to the trinity 
contention, it is the parts-confused view that makes Ramsey’s opponent vulnerable 
to the incomprehensible trinity argument as a reductio ad absurdum. And it should 
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come as little surprise that a theory containing a confused view would be vulnerable 
in this way. 
 
3.2.3 The parts-confused straw man 
Of course, these observations do not yet deliver Ramsey from the woods. Instead 
they reveals wherein Ramsey’s real error might lie. For, the parts-confused view 
may not be Ramsey’s but it still seems a mistake for him to attribute it to his 
opponent. Insofar as CU is taken to be the opponent of the argument we have, as 
yet, found no reason for CU to be committed to the parts-confused view or for any 
feature of CU to imply the mistake in question. This leaves us with the worry that 
Ramsey’s argument attacks a straw man which becomes a worry towards the 
legitimacy and utility of the only target that the incomprehensible trinity argument 
can be said to refute. 
 
The straw man worry 
The view characterised in CU holds that in compound propositions we can discern 
complex predicates that denote complex universals. Preceding the lengthy 
elucidation of analysis and decomposition we said in §3.1.2 that it seemed that one 
could maintain CU while remaining agnostic as to how the compound propositions 
where structured and in particular whether complex predicates individuated the 
propositions they were a part of - that is - whether a proposition’s component 
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structure was unique. In other words, we concluded that the proponent of CU 
could remain agnostic regarding the concerns of the parts-confusion view. 
     Considering the parts-confused view in more depth, we found there to be more 
tension than mere agnosticism. For the parts-confused view holds that the complex 
predicates recognised by CU are names for complex universals in the same way that 
simple predicates are names for simple universals. On this confused view, a 
proposition’s complex parts are erroneously attributed with features of its simple 
parts. It would be strange, therefore, for CU to treat complex parts as if they were 
simple when the theory solely concerns complex predicates. It not only seems, 
therefore, that the proponent of CU need take no stance on whether a complex 
predicate is a simple name, but that such a view is in tension with the theory put 
forward in CU. 
     Thus, while it might be clear that the mistaken view is not Ramsey’s own in a 
straightforward way, this opens up further questions as to whether Ramsey makes 
another kind of mistake in deriving the parts-confused view from CU. Since CU 
cannot be charged with adhering to the parts-confused view it seems that Ramsey’s 
argument attacks a mere straw man. 
 
The confused man 
We must recognise, however, that accusing Ramsey of attacking up a straw man 
results in a rather curious scenario. After all, the incomprehensible trinity argument 
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is born from a characterisation of CU that Ramsey himself suggests. To argue that 
Ramsey’s argument fails because he defeats a mere straw man is to say that Ramsey 
characterises a certain position and then mistakenly levels an argument against a 
different position. Less abstractly: that he characterises CU and then attacks a view 
that maintains both CU and the parts-confused view. It is not impossible that this is 
what Ramsey has done, of course. But it seems more likely that it is Ramsey’s 
characterisation of his opponent that was mistaken or not completely explicit and 
that the so-called ‘straw man’ was the real target all along.    
     If this was the case then Ramsey would be attacking a man that was more 
substantial than straw. For it would be much less damaging to accuse Ramsey of not 
explicitly identifying all of the commitments of his opponent than of 
underestimating him. This would be more of an elucidation of Ramsey’s real target 
than a criticism of his argument. If we suppose Ramsey’s opponent to be anyone 
who adopts both the position of CU and the parts-confusion view this guarantees 
the success of the reductio. However, if we are to use this as a defence of Ramsey’s 
argument it must be that there is evidence that Ramsey does indeed attack this 
combination of views and, most importantly, that there is sufficient motivation for 
Ramsey to do so. 
     It is all very well to suppose that, given the set-up of the argument, Ramsey’s 
real target was the view that adheres both to CU and the parts-confusion 
(henceforth known as the confused man view). But it is another matter to argue 
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what use it is for Ramsey to defeat such an opponent. For it may be that, trivially, 
the incomprehensible trinity argument functions against this view, but it doesn’t 
seem like much of a victory to defeat a view that adheres to a confusion in this way. 
     Therefore, in order to elaborate the suggestion that Ramsey intends to attack the 
confused man, into a real defence of Ramsey’s argument we must investigate how 
plausible it is that Ramsey’s argument is aimed at attacking not merely CU but CU 
and the parts-confused view. In other words, we must consider whether Universals 
as a whole provides sufficient reason for Ramsey to deny the view that complex 
predicates are simple names of universals. Such an investigation may be carried out 
by returning to Ramsey’s conclusion and target in Universals as we identified in 
chapter one, and by considering what role the incomprehensible trinity argument 
plays towards Ramsey’s overall conclusion as we brought out in chapter two. 
 
3.3 The confused man in the context of Universals 
Having identified a possible avenue of defence for the incomprehensible trinity 
argument this section will now consider whether Ramsey has any motivation for 
defeating the view that the complex predicates recognised by CU are names for 
complex universals in the same way that simple predicates are names for simple 
universals. We dubbed this the confused man view and found it to be the only view 
that the incomprehensible trinity argument to successfully reduce to absurdity. 
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3.3.1 The role of the incomprehensible trinity argument  
To establish the missing motivation we must first return to the macro-purpose of 
Ramsey’s paper, as we discussed in chapter one; as well as the role that the 
incomprehensible trinity argument plays towards this end, as we discussed in 
chapter two. Once this is in place we may consider whether refuting the view that 
Ramsey’s arguments attack has a purpose in the over-all context of Ramsey’s paper. 
For if it does not then we shall have identified a powerful objection to Ramsey. We 
will have exposed the incomprehensible trinity argument as a faulty cog in the 
intricately connected mechanism of his argumentation. Since we saw in chapter two 
how the incomprehensible trinity argument is needed in order to successfully reject 
the view Ramsey opposes, such a result would carry the double blow of trivialising 
Ramsey’s argument and denying him the success of his conclusion. If the wider 
context of the article does, however, secure a motivation for attacking the confused 
man then we shall have achieved a precise explanation of Ramsey’s contention. For, 
the identification of such a motivation will further elucidate what Ramsey is 
concerned to deny regarding universals and in particular will make perspicuous the 
subtlety of his rejection of a certain kind of incompleteness. 
 
Review of chapter one and two 
Let us begin by reminding ourselves of the context already put in place by the 
previous two chapters. Chapter one identified exactly what it is that Ramsey aims to 
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reject in Universals. It found that Ramsey’s view is that no object in reality is PLA-
incomplete and that, as such, his paper aims to target a specific conception of a 
universal as being intrinsically incomplete in a way that particulars are not.  
     Chapter two identified how Ramsey rejects this conception of a universal. It 
found that Ramsey employs a diagnosis that identifies the reasons that universals are 
conceived of in this way and directs his arguments towards attacking those reasons. 
In particular we grouped the various arguments in Ramsey’s paper as attacking the 
claim that complex predicates are names (A*) and the claim that simple predicates 
are PLA-incomplete (B*). This strategy enables Ramsey to conclude that there is no 
a priori reason to conceive of universals as PLA-incomplete, and although he 
remains agnostic as to whether some other considerations outside of the diagnosis 
may independently establish that universals exist, there is no strong presumption in 
favour of this happening. Simple predicates have only been conceived of as PLA-
incomplete as the result of a muddle- because they have been assimilated into a 
single class with complex predicates and the distinct properties of both symbols 
have mistakenly assumed to be the properties of a single type of symbol which is 
both PLA-incomplete and names an object in reality. 
 
Review of the role of the incomprehensible trinity argument 
We saw that the purpose of the incomprehensible trinity argument to be is to reject 
the view that complex predicates are names (A*). Refuting this view is the 
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contribution of the argument to the overall purpose of Universals, that is, towards 
denying that PLA-incomplete symbols can be taken as a basis from which to infer 
that PLA-incompleteness is a feature of objects in reality. 
     In this chapter we have seen that Ramsey explicitly takes the argument to 
counter the view that in propositions we can discern complex predicates which 
name complex universals (CU). This is a minor elaboration of the view that we 
expressed in A*: that complex predicates are names, since, if complex predicates 
were names they would of course name complex universals corresponding to the 
complexity of their denotations. 
     However, we also saw the only view that the incomprehensible trinity argument 
can be said to counteract is one that adheres to both CU and the parts-confused 
view (which we called the confused man’s view). That is to say, a theory that holds 
that complex predicates in complex propositions name complex universals and also 
holds that complex predicates are simple constituent parts of propositions. Such a 
theory would therefore maintain that a complex predicate names a complex 
universal in the same way that a simple predicate names a simple universal. We can 
express this as the view: 
A** Complex predicates are simple names 
     Comparing A* and A** makes it clear which aspect of the confused man’s view 
is problematic. For although the context of Ramsey’s overarching argument 
explains why he must reject the view that complex predicates are names (A*) it 
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remains unclear why he should reject the view that complex predicates stand in a 
simple naming relationship to that which they designate (A**). 
 
3.3.2 Why simple? 
This section will identify a motivation for why Ramsey must deny A** which will 
draw on the wider context of Ramsey’s argument. In the course of doing so it will 
make explicit two assumptions that underlie Ramsey’s rejection of the view that 
complex predicates name universals in the same way that simple predicates do. 
 
The word-world link 
The key to understanding why Ramsey must reject A** is to ask why Ramsey must 
reject A*. In other words, we must remind ourselves why it is that Ramsey wants 
to deny that complex predicates are names. We said in §2.1.3 that since Ramsey 
accepts that complex predicates are PLA-incomplete (B) he must deny that complex 
predicates denote anything in reality, since what they would name would be objects 
that were PLA-incomplete corresponding to that which named them. Ramsey’s real 
aim, then, is to deny that any objects in reality are PLA-incomplete and that such 
incompleteness can be read into the world from of a feature of symbols. 
     When we expounded this point we exploited an assumption that we saw Russell 
make in PLA. That is, the assumption of a link between language and the world and 
in particular that there are certain features of language that that must mirror 
features of reality for language to be successful. These kinds of features we can think 
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of roughly as ones pertaining to the ability to combine with other elements, so that 
the possibility intrinsic to a term in an atomic proposition for combining with other 
terms in a proposition reflects the possibility intrinsic to the objects in an atomic 
fact for combining with other objects in a fact (Russell, 197:248). This is why 
regarding the search for a metaphysical division in reality Russell considers it fruitful 
to turn to language and to try to identify a logical distinction in language. In other 
words Russell is looking for a division in the intrinsic nature of the elements in an 
atomic proposition because this is what would enable him to infer that such a 
division must be reflected in reality and therefore that there is a distinction between 
the intrinsic nature of objects such that we may call one complete and one 
incomplete and one a particular and one a universal. 
     Ramsey shares this assumption in Universals. As we already saw in §1.3.1 he 
shares Russell’s belief that a distinction between particular and universal can only be 
established via a logical distinction, that is, a logical distinction in language. It’s also 
clear that Ramsey considers there to be the same kind of link between language and 
the world. As he sets up his enquiry he emphasises that his concern with language is 
only towards ‘discover[ing] the logical nature of reality (Ramsey, 1931:117).’ If 
Ramsey did not share this assumption with Russell then there would be no point to 
his engaging and attacking the views A* and B* since a mere feature of a predicate 
(whether simple or complex) could not be a possible reason to conclude anything 
about the incompleteness of universals. 
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The missing motivation 
In order to locate a motivation for defeating the confused man we must keep in 
view that Ramsey’s target is the idea that there is PLA-incompleteness in the 
reality. In order to reject this idea Ramsey engages with the reasons that PLA-
incompleteness has been read into the world. We saw that one of these reasons was 
the belief that complex predicates were names. We have to appreciate, then, that 
Ramsey is only concerned with the premise that complex predicates are names in so 
far as it provides a reason to consider PLA-incompleteness a feature of an object in 
the world. Ramsey maintains, of course, that not all features of symbols should be 
read into features of the world. Indeed, this is a way to characterise the very 
contention of Ramsey’s essay. 
 
I shall argue that nearly all philosophers, including Mr Russell himself, have been misled 
by language in a far more far-reaching way…that the whole theory of particulars and 
universals is due to mistaking for a fundamental characteristic of reality what is merely a 
characteristic of language (Ramsey, 1931:117). 
 
Therefore Ramsey is only concerned with those symbols whose features are such 
that they can be read into the features of objects. 
     We must ask, therefore, which symbols have this characteristic such that we 
could infer from their incompleteness an incompleteness in the objects they denote. 
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Well, according to Ramsey there are two kinds of symbol: names, that is, simple 
names; and incomplete symbols, that is, Russell-incomplete symbols. We’ve said 
already that Ramsey holds a simple name to be such a symbol (Ramsey, 1931:120-
121, 130). So that the incompleteness of a simple name would allow us to 
legitimately assume some corresponding incompleteness in the object that it stood 
for. On the other hand we also saw that a Russell-incomplete symbol has its 
denotation in a more indirect way. Such a symbol refers to an object in virtue of the 
several simple symbols named in its definition. For this reason there is no complex 
object that directly corresponds to the Russell-incomplete symbol and as such no 
features of the incomplete symbol can be used to investigate the features of 
something in the world. In particular, the incompleteness of a Russell-incomplete 
symbol such as ‘the author of Waverley’ does not transfer incompleteness to 
anything in reality. 
      Therefore, only a simple naming relationship between symbol and object will 
give us reason to infer from the intrinsic incompleteness of one, the intrinsic 
incompleteness of the other. This provides the missing motivation for Ramsey to 
attack the view that complex predicates are simple names (A**). We are thus able 
to see how Ramsey’s argument works by understanding it in the wider context of 
his article. The incomprehensible trinity argument attacks the view that complex 
predicates are simple names because we cannot assume that the features of a 
Russell-incomplete symbol correspond to objects in reality and therefore only a 
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simple name will enable us to infer PLA-incompleteness into the world. Since 
Ramsey’s aim is to deny that PLA-incompleteness is a feature of the world it follows 
that he is only concerned to deny that complex predicates are names (A*) insofar as 
this is interpreted to mean that complex predicates designate in the same way as 
simple names (A**) and thus give us licence to infer from their incompleteness an 
intrinsic incompleteness in reality. 
 
Ramsey’s assumption  
Although we have seemingly identified the motivation that legitimises Ramsey in 
attacking the view that complex predicates are simple names this does not yet 
deliver the result that the incomprehensible trinity argument is uncontroversially 
successful. It should already be apparent that in order to ground the motivation we 
identified Ramsey needs to be granted a certain assumption. This is the assumption 
that all symbols can be divided into simple names or Russell-incomplete symbols.  
     Ramsey makes this assumption throughout his essay, most explicitly in his 
diagnosis (Ramsey, 1931:131-134). However, it has a particular significance to the 
incomprehensible trinity argument. For, if we grant Ramsey that the only sense in 
which a complex predicate refers is either as a simple designation or as a Russell-
incomplete symbol then to understand the point of the incomprehensible trinity 
argument reducing to absurdity the view that it does (the view we called A**) we 
need only point out that Ramsey’s aim is to reject incompleteness in reality and the 
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fact that the incompleteness of a symbol does not tell us anything about the world 
unless it is a simple name.  
     However, it is not obvious that this is the only alternative. In particular it’s not 
obvious why, for Ramsey, a name must be simple. Frege, and Dummett after him, 
distinguished between a simple proper name and a complex proper name 
(Dummett, 1973:183, Frege, 1969:387,156). On this view there are simple names 
like ‘six’ but also complex names like ‘four plus two’ so that the complexity of a 
symbol does not exclude it from being a name or even from naming the same object 
as simple symbol. As such it is unclear why a symbol could not be a name while also 
standing in a complex designation relation to an object, designating an object in 
virtue of its simple parts. Most importantly it is unclear why the complex symbol 
could not maintain some correspondence between its features and the features of its 
denotation. If we held that a complex predicate was a complex name of a complex 
universal, for instance, we might consider the complexity of the universal to be 
mirrored by the complexity of the predicate that denotes it. Thus we might 
legitimately wonder whether incompleteness was a similar kind of feature so that 
we could infer from the intrinsic incompleteness of a proper complex name the 
intrinsic incompleteness of the complex entity that it stood for. 
     Here we find ourselves in the realm of speculation, but this is only in order to 
illustrate the kinds of considerations that Ramsey does not exclude with the 
arguments he makes. In particular the incomprehensible trinity argument by itself 
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does not give us any reason to consider the division between simple names and 
Russell-incomplete symbols exhaustive with regard to all symbols. If Ramsey has a 
reason for maintaining this assumption it is to be sought in his more general 
ontological framework. For the assumption is not a linguistic contention but is 
rather born from Ramsey’s background metaphysic commitments, in particular, 
from the basic principles of logical atomism that Ramsey inherits from Russell and 
from Wittgenstein. The idea that only the atoms yielded by logical analysis should 
be considered to name objects, that only the simple names in atomic proposition are 
the ones that latch onto the world and as such generate our ontological 
commitments, is not defended by Ramsey in his paper; and the search for a defence 
of such an assumption is beyond the scope of this thesis. 
     This is not to suggest that Ramsey straightforwardly overlooked providing a 
defence of this assumption. There is an obvious tactical reason we might suggest for 
why he left his position undefended. This is of course that Russell, his original 
target, shares the same assumption. For this reason we can say that Ramsey’s 
argument is successful as an internal critique of Russell’s position regarding 
universals in PLA. Russell’s dichotomy between simple names and incomplete 
symbols legitimates Ramsey as targeting the theory that complex predicates are 
simple names for complex universals (A**) since this is the only view that would 
enable Russell to infer from the incompleteness of the complex predicate that some 
objects in the world were intrinsically more incomplete than others. The 
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incomprehensible trinity argument then exploits the features of a simple designation 
relationship to expose (A**) as untenable. In this case it is clear that Russell must 
more easily give up his conception of a universal as PLA-incomplete rather than 
such a fundamental axiom to his logical atomism. 
     However, as we have already discussed, strictly speaking the target of Ramsey’s 
paper is not Russell but rather a certain conception of universals as PLA-incomplete 
wrongly believed to have arising from a priori considerations that is manifest in 
Russell’s theory of universals in PLA. Therefore, although Ramsey’s argument 
might internally persuade Russell of the error of his ways, it remains an open 
question whether the argument will be effective independent of a commitment to 
Russell’s atomism. The effectiveness of the incomprehensible trinity argument will 
therefore depend on how far we should adopt the assumption that the division of 
symbols into names and incomplete symbols is exhaustive. Within the article at 
least, Ramsey gives us no reason to think that we should do so, other than merely 
inhabiting the view himself and demonstrating its advantages indirectly. 
 
3.4 Conclusion to chapter three 
Employing Dummett’s distinction between analysis and decomposition, therefore, 
irreversibly damages success of the incomprehensible trinity argument unless we 
take into account the surrounding context of Ramsey’s article. Bringing into play 
the wider context of Ramsey’s intricately constructed combination of argument and 
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diagnosis exposes the mechanisms that the incomprehensible trinity argument relies 
upon. On the one hand it offers us an understanding of how the incomprehensible 
trinity argument successfully functions but on the other hand it exposes certain 
atomistic assumptions that the argument relies upon to do so. We have first of all 
the assumption of some link between language and the world so that an 
investigation into the logical features of language can be considered a fruitful 
method by which to investigate certain features of reality. Even more debatable is 
the second assumption that there is an exhaustive division between those things that 
have simple designative relations to objects and those things that are Russell-
incomplete and refer to the objects via the several simple symbols that compose it. 
     Although it is beyond the scope of this thesis to vindicate either assumption we 
can still observe that hinging the success of the reductio on the extent to which 
Ramsey’s opponent is committed to these assumptions puts Ramsey in a better 
position than before. It is certainly preferable than concluding that the 
incomprehensible trinity argument is based the faulty assumption that complex 
predicates are simple. Though it is true that the assumptions we have identified 
need to be supported, this is not a task for Ramsey’s focused critique. Such a task 
has a place in the context of a broader defence of the project of logical atomism and 
of its basic tenets. Exposing the atomism that underlies Ramsey’s article and in 
particular the success of the incomprehensible trinity argument shows that the 
atomistic assumptions that Ramsey makes, though undefended, are tenable 
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positions. Furthermore it exposes the background metaphysical view that Ramsey 
maintains in the article and reveals Ramsey’s sensitivity to the wider implications of 
Russell’s logical atomism on the local position that Russell adopts regarding 
universals. 
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Conclusion 
 
In chapter one we established exactly what Ramsey aimed to reject in Universals: the 
idea of a universal as specially incomplete, as dependant on the form of the 
proposition in a way that particulars were not. In chapter two we expounded the 
arguments in Universals using a framework that emphasised their interdependence 
and their role in establishing the main conclusion of universals. In chapter three we 
assessed the incomprehensible trinity argument and used the wider context of the 
argument established in the first two chapters to argue that analysis and 
decomposition provides an elucidation of the argument rather than a decisive 
criticism of it. 
     This thesis is only a beginning towards the task of providing a thorough exegesis 
of Ramsey’s essay that is sensitive to its intricate structure and main concerns. 
Another exegesis would be able to consider the features and functions of the 
different arguments in the essay in more depth. The exposition that is given is 
intended to provide enough context to support the final chapter where we consider 
an extremely powerful criticism that has been raised against one of Ramsey’s central 
arguments. Taking into account the wider context of the method and target of 
Ramsey’s argument renders his position safe from the particular criticism levelled 
against him by Dummett.  
151 
 
     I do not, however, claim to have rendered Ramsey’s incomprehensible trinity 
argument secure from all criticism. All that the thesis establishes is that the 
incomprehensible trinity argument relies on different assumptions in order to be 
successful. Of course, the assumptions that I accuse Ramsey of making are a lot 
more tenable than the parts-confused position attributed to him by Dummett. 
Furthermore, since these assumptions issue from Ramsey’s background 
metaphysical view it is at least understandable, in part, why Ramsey did not attempt 
to explicitly defend them, despite their importance to the argument. The source of 
the atomist view is, after all, the explicit target of the paper and so Ramsey can to 
some extent bracket a defence of the relevant assumptions which would require a 
defence of a metaphysical position outwith the bounds of Ramsey’s concerns in the 
essay. 
     Although I have provided an explanation for why Ramsey does not defend his 
atomistic assumptions this is only to note the practical reasons for his omission and 
not to vindicate the assumptions themselves or deny that a defence of them is 
necessary for the success of his argument. In this sense the thesis takes no stance on 
whether the incomprehensible trinity argument is ultimately successful. Instead it 
merely exposes the fact that in order to be successful the argument requires there to 
be a correspondence between symbols and the objects they name and for this to be 
true in such a way that only a simple naming relationship between them could give 
us reason to infer from the incompleteness of a symbol an incompleteness in the 
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object that it names. These are, of course, unobvious assumptions based on a 
contentious metaphysical view. The success of the incomprehensible trinity 
argument is therefore dependent on the extent to which one is committed to these 
atomistic assumptions. 
     Rather than a direct defence of Ramsey’s argument, then, this thesis is intended 
to be an exercise in demonstrating that being sensitive to the context of Ramsey’s 
argument reveals a much underestimated position. For, if we are to argue that the 
argument is unsuccessful it must not be on the grounds that it conflates features of 
analysis with features of decomposition; to do so would be to attack a straw 
Ramsey. Instead, we must challenge the assumptions of his atomism and in 
particular, I think, ask whether there is any reason to hold that there cannot be 
complex names so that the correspondence of incompleteness between symbol and 
object at the atomic level extends to some complex terms (i.e. those that are not 
Russell-incomplete symbols). This involves investigating whether the assumptions 
of Russell’s logical atomism that Ramsey’s argument employs can be made tenable 
outside of this particular metaphysical view.  
     Taking this approach, therefore, reveal’s Ramsey’s incomprehensible trinity 
argument to be a much stronger argument that it has been made out to be by its 
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commentators and most importantly brings back to the fore the real contentions of 
Ramsey’s Universals.10 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
10
 Thanks to James McGuiggan for comments on a draft. And to Peter Sullivan, for his supervision, his 
discussion, his unwavering standards, his invaluable suggestions, and his support.  
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